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ABSTRACT 
 
Brand harm crisis often result in negative consumer responses. This thesis addresses the 
buffering and amplifying theoretical perspectives of brand equity effects. We theorize that brand 
equity may interplay with the nature of brand-harm crisis in shaping consumer reactions. Results 
from focus group studies provide interesting insights into the amplifying and buffering effects. 
Moreover, research findings from two experiment studies show that brand equity amplifies 
consumer negative responses in a performance-related crisis but only when the crisis is 
extremely severe. When the crisis becomes less severe, the amplifying effect diminishes from 
outset. However, in a value-related crisis, the amplifying effect of brand equity is pervasive 
regardless of the level of crisis severity. The current thesis adds to the extant literature by 
demonstrating that brand equity can have very complex effects on consumer responses, which 
are contingent on the severity and domain of a crisis. Theoretical and managerial implications 
are discussed.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Brand crises are becoming increasingly prevalent in today’s marketplace. Some notable 
examples include KFC’s toxic chicken scandal in China, Toyota’s worldwide recall due to 
unintended acceleration problem, Texaco’s racial discrimination litigation and Nike’s employing 
child labor in developing countries. These well-publicized incidents are defined as either 
performance-related or value-related brand crises depending on whether the crises mainly 
involve defective products or unethical firm conducts (Siomkos and Kurzbard 1994; Dawar and 
Pillutla 2000; Pullig et al. 2006). Such brand crises can be extremely devastating for the involved 
brands. For example, the sales in China plummeted by 41% due to KFC’s chicken scandal in 
2012, whereas the Toyota’s recall of more than 8.5 million cars cost over $5 billion, and Texaco 
paid $178 million on legal judgments for its racial discrimination (Reuters 2013; Sanchanta and 
Takahashi 2010; Gregory et al. 2012). Except for the tremendous immediate loss from baseline 
sales and costly compensations, brand crises may also have some far-reaching detriments on the 
involved brand in the long run such as loss of customers’ confidence, downgraded quality 
perceptions and customer distrust (e.g., Van Heerde et al. 2007; Darke et al. 2010). Considering 
the enormous negative impact from brand crises, it is imperative to identify and understand key 
factors influencing consumer responses. 
Previous literature has identified various consumer-, firm-, and/or crisis-related factors 
that influence consumer responses to a brand crisis. For example, brand commitment has been 
demonstrated to attenuate consumer negative responses towards brand negative publicity 
(Ahluwalia et al. 2000). Firm quality reputation, on the other hand, has been found to be a 
liability, hurting future market share in automobile industry after product recalls (Rhee and 
Haunschild 2006). The frequency of a crisis has also been identified to affect consumers’ 
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attributions towards a brand transgression (Lei et al. 2012). However, the role of brand equity, a 
key marketing construct, has rarely been examined in the context of brand crisis (Dawar 1998; 
Rea et al. 2014). In this research, we identity some of the contradictory perspectives regarding 
the role of brand equity, and attempt to address the following two research questions: Is brand 
equity an asset or a liability in a brand crisis? Are there any boundary conditions that will 
influence brand equity’s effect? Theoretically, there are compelling arguments regarding the role 
of brand equity in relation to consumer responses to brand crisis. On one hand, prior positive 
brand associations derived from strong brand equity may bias consumers’ evaluations against the 
crisis information, offsetting their negative responses (e.g., Brady et al. 2008; Cleeren et al. 2008; 
Rea et al. 2014). One the other hand, the drastic contrast between a negative crisis and a 
reputable brand may exacerbate consumers’ backlash, intensifying their negative responses (e.g., 
Seo and Jang 2013). To unravel the seemingly contradictory effects, we posit that there might be 
some important contingent conditions that further explain brand equity’s effects. We argue that 
the nature of brand crisis can be important contingency condition in this case. Thus, we adopt a 
contingency perspective to examine the role of brand equity in a brand crisis context. 
Specifically, we include crisis severity and crisis type as two important contingency variables in 
our theoretical framework.  
  As limited research has addressed how brand equity works in a brand crisis, we first 
conducted focus group studies so as to gain some baseline understanding about brand equity’s 
role and explore potential boundary conditions. The insights of focus group studies suggest that 
brand equity can both attenuate and augment consumer negative responses, and such effects may 
be contingent on crisis severity and crisis type (performance-based vs. value-based). In turn, we 
develop a theoretical framework that explicitly addresses buffering and amplifying effects of 
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brand equity in a crisis context. Two laboratory experiments were conducted to test our 
framework. We also delineate and test the psychological processes responsible for brand equity’s 
differential effects in different brand crisis contexts. Specifically, Experiment 1 examined brand 
equity’s role in performance-related crises. The results demonstrate that brand equity amplifies 
consumer negative responses but only when the crisis is of high severity. Consumers’ 
counterarguments were identified to account for the absence of brand equity’s boomerang effect 
in a low severity condition, whereas disconfirmation of expectation was demonstrated to mediate 
the amplifying effect in a high severity condition. Experiment 2 essentially replicates Experiment 
1 by extending the theoretical model to the context of value-related crisis. The results reveal that 
brand equity augments consumer negative responses in a value-related crisis regardless of the 
crisis severity. Disconfirmation of expectation was found to account for (i.e., mediate) this 
amplifying effect in both low and high severity conditions. 
 The rest of the thesis will be organized as follows: first, theoretical contributions of this 
thesis will be highlighted. Second, literature on brand crises will be reviewed. Next, a focus 
group study will be discussed. Then hypotheses regarding brand equity’s role in performance-
related crises and its process explanations are developed, followed by the discussion on study 1. 
In the same fashion, next, hypotheses about brand equity’ effect in value-related crises and its 
underlying mechanisms are developed, followed by the discussion on study 2. Finally, the thesis 
will conclude with a general discussion including theoretical and managerial implications, as 
well as limitations and directions for future research. 
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2. CONTRIBUTION 
 
 First, this research extends negative publicity literature by examining the role of an 
important yet rarely explored construct – brand equity, in consumers’ responses to a brand harm 
crisis. While prior research has addressed some related constructs such as brand commitment, 
brand familiarity, and brand expectations (Ahluwalia et al. 2000; Cleeren et al. 2008; Dawar and 
Pillutla 2000), few studies  have specifically examined brand equity’s effect in such a brand 
crisis context (Dawar 1998). In a recent study, Rea et al. (2014) have highlighted the critical role 
of brand equity in shaping consumers’ reactions to the brand-harm crisis. Our research advances 
a better understanding of the impact of brand crisis by specifically examining the role of brand 
equity and its contingent conditions.  This is one of the few studies that looked into brand equity 
effects in a negative publicity context. In addition, we contend that our study on brand equity has 
strong managerial significance due to the wide accessibility of brand equity reports provided by 
consultancy firms such as Interbrand.  
 Second, our research contributes to the literature by incorporating contingency theory 
into negative publicity research. Given the tangle of findings in the brand crisis literature, 
contingency theory provides a promising avenue to resolve the conflicts in this field. Specifically, 
we addresses both buffering and amplifying theoretical perspectives of brand equity’s effect, and 
developed a contingency-based framework by including crisis severity and crisis type as key 
contingency variables to examine brand equity’s effect on consumer negative responses. To the 
best of our knowledge, this is the first research that revealed the moderating roles of crisis 
severity and crisis type with regard to the impact of brand equity in a brand harm crisis context. 
In addition, given a scarcity of literature on value-related crisis, this thesis also helps to enhance 
understanding on consumers’ experience and responses on firm unethical conducts. Moreover, 
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our framework can also provide some guidance to crisis managers by showing them a practical 
method to evaluate the potential backlash from consumers given specific crisis situations. 
 Finally, our research also enhances understanding on consumers’ processing of negative 
publicity information by delineating the psychological mechanisms underlying the effects of 
brand equity on consumer responses. Though previous literature has shed some lights on the 
underling mechanisms for both buffering and amplifying effects from certain psychological rent, 
we contend that multiple psychological mechanisms can coexist and the activation/domination of 
certain mechanism is contingent on contextual factors such as crisis severity and crisis type 
(Ahluwalia et al. 2000; Dawar and Pillutla 2000). This thesis is among one of the few studies 
that tested the interplay of multiple psychological mechanisms related to brand harm crisis.  We 
believe that this stream of thoughts can provide a promising avenue for future research. In 
addition, this detailed understanding on consumer psychological mechanisms can also help 
facilitate crisis managers in designing more effective PR policies and response strategies when 
faced with a brand crisis. 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This section will provide an overview of the key constructs in this research and highlight 
the conceptualization about customer-based brand equity, brand crisis, and crisis typology. 
Theoretical perspectives of brand crisis and relevant findings will be described. The discussion 
will tap into supporting theories regarding buffering, amplifying as well as contingency 
perspective in the brand crisis literature. 
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3.1.Customer-Based Brand Equity 
 
Building a strong brand can yield numerous competitive advantages. Keller (1998; 2003) 
showed that companies with high brand equity can not only charge premium prices on customers, 
but also benefit from customer loyalty and long-term customer relationship. In addition, high 
equity brands are less vulnerable to competitor actions (Keller 2003). Moreover, a strong brand 
can better leverage the efficiency of various marketing activities such as extension-, 
communication-, and channel-related marketing activity (Hoeffler and Keller 2003). Apart from 
numerous benefits in routine situations, recent studies also indicate that a strong brand may be 
able to provide some protection against the negative effects in abnormal situations such as in a 
product-harm crisis. For example, case studies based on 1996 Kraft peanut butter recall have 
shown that compared with the weaker brand Eta, the stronger brand Kraft regained market share 
more quickly and enjoyed better efficiency on its marketing activities (e.g., Cleeren, Dekimpe 
and Helsen 2008; Darke, Ashworth and Main 2010). Also, several studies in the corporate 
reputation literatures suggest that a good prior reputation can attenuate consumer negative 
responses in a brand crisis context (e.g., Siomkos and Kurzbard 1994; Decker 2012). Yet 
surprisingly, limited research has actually examined the role of brand equity in a brand crisis 
context. In the following section, we provide conceptualization on the customer-based brand 
equity construct and distinguish it from some closely related constructs. 
Brand equity has been conceptualized by various researchers at various levels, including 
stock-market valuation measures, revenue premium measures, signaling ability measures based 
on information economics perspective as well as customer-based mental association measures 
based on cognitive psychology (Simon and Sullivan 1993; Ailawadi et al. 2003; Erdem and 
Swait 1998; Keller 1993). Each perspective captures different domains of the brand equity 
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concept. Given the purpose of this thesis, we take the customer-based view of brand equity and 
draw the conceptualization from Keller (1993, p. 2) who defined customer-based brand equity as 
“the differential effect of brand knowledge on consumer response to the marketing of the brand”. 
Such differential consumer response derives from brand knowledge stored in consumers’ mind, 
which is structured as a network of associations in memory about brand-related beliefs such as 
brand awareness and brand image. In this sense, customer-based brand equity occurs when 
people have substantial brand knowledge with readily accessible and favorable brand 
associations in memory, and such associations generally come from some direct or indirect 
sources such as personal experience or advertising (Keller 1993, 1998). In another word, 
customer-based brand equity manifests itself as the brand knowledge structure in the minds of 
consumers. Based on this conceptualization, we contend that consumers should have more 
positive and accessible brand associations towards high-equity brands. 
Brand equity is often vaguely described in the previous negative brand publicity literature. 
Various related constructs such as brand commitment, brand familiarity, brand image as well as 
brand reputation have been used as proxies for brand equity (Germann et al. 2014; Dawar and 
Lei 2009; Siomkos and Kurzbard 1994; Decker 2012). Although these literatures often 
concluded with that a “good” or “strong” brand can provide a buffer against consumer negative 
responses, ironically, very few studies actually addressed the customer-based brand equity 
construct. Therefore, we believe it is desirable to first distinguish brand equity from some similar 
constructs such as brand commitment, brand familiarity, and corporate reputation. The 
clarification on constructs is also one of the key steps in the process of theory development 
(Stern et al. 2001).  
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We view brand equity as a related yet distinct construct from brand familiarity, brand 
commitment, and brand image (Arnett et al. 2003). While brand familiarity only pertains to one’s 
ability to recall or recognize brand-related information, brand equity is a conceptually broader 
construct, incorporating multiple facets of consumer brand knowledge  (Keller 1993). Also, 
unlike brand commitment which involves explicit behavioral bindings, brand equity does not 
request any observable actions and can be manifested as implicit perceptions towards the brand 
(Ahluwalia et al. 2000). In addition, based on Keller’s (1993) conceptualization, brand image 
only pertains to one dimension of brand equity construct while brand awareness is not 
incorporated in the brand image construct. Such distinctions are in line with Petty and Krosnick’s 
(1995) warning that generalizing outcomes and processes from one attitude strength dimension 
to another should be constrained. Drawing from Aaker’s (1996) and Keller’s (1993) 
conceptualization, Yoo and Donthu (2001) developed and validated a multidimensional 
customer-based brand equity scales including brand image, brand awareness, brand quality as 
well as brand loyalty. In relation to multidimensional approach to brand equity, we argue that 
brand equity should be perceived as a higher order construct which captures various attitudinal 
and behavioral components of consumer knowledge  
We choose to examine brand equity in this thesis for several reasons. First, brand equity 
has become one of the most important concepts in the marketing literature, yet its effect in a 
brand crisis context has received limited attention (Aaker 1996; Keller 1998). To understand the 
role of this important concept in both routine and non-routine situations should be especially 
beneficial for theory building and development in the brand equity literature. Second, it is a 
higher order construct encompassing various important attitude dimensions. Instead of 
examining subcomponents, looking at the same phenomenon from a higher level of hierarchy 
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may provide some new insights. Third, compared with its nuanced attitudinal components, brand 
equity is relatively easier to understand and monitor for practitioners due to the wide 
accessibility of brand equity reports provided by consultancy firms such as Interbrand. Krishnan 
(1996) also showed that consumer-based brand equity is consistent with external equity 
indicators. Therefore, our research on brand equity should have stronger managerial significance. 
 
3.2.Brand Crisis 
 
In this research, brand crises are defined as well-publicized incidents in which a brand’s 
perceived ability to deliver expected benefits is seriously threatened due to defective and 
dangerous products or violation of ethical norms (Siomkos and Kurzbard 1994; Dawar and 
Pillutla 2000; Huber et al. 2009). Although Huber et al. (2009) classified performance failure as 
one type of brand crisis, and many previous literatures also examined performance and service 
failure as a crisis, in this thesis, we refine our focus on the phenomenon of negative brand 
publicity (Brady et al. 2008; Choi and mattila 2008; Laczniak et al. 2001). Unlike product 
performance or service failure, negative brand publicity is typically involved in the incident that 
is well-publicized and can seriously threaten a brand’s key propositions. As such, we restrict our 
literature review and conceptual development to the emerging literature on negative brand 
publicity.  
Brand crises are among a firm’s worst nightmares, causing both immediate and long-term 
negative effects such as a substantial loss in baseline sales, costly remedies, reduced marketing 
effectiveness, increased vulnerability to competitors’ marketing instruments, damaged brand 
equity, tarnished reputation and a considerable loss in investors’ confidence (Van Heerde et al. 
2007; Cleeren et al. 2008; Laufer and Coombs 2006; Rhee and Haunschild 2006; Siomkos and 
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Kurzbard 1994; Chen et al. 2009). In addition, brand crises may also spillover to other non-
contaminated brands, leading to industry-wide damage (Roehm and Tybout 2006; Lei et al. 
2008). Recently, there’s an increasing academic interest in consumer-related consequences of 
brand crises. Various negative effects from a consumer perspective have been documented in 
various crisis contexts (Ahluwalia et al. 2000; Dawar and Pillutla 2000; Creyer and Ross 1996; 
Folkes and Kamins 1999). For example, Ahluwalia et al. (2000) identified a substantial attitude 
decline after consumers are exposed to product-harm crises. Similarly, Dawar and Lei (2009) 
found that product-harm crises can significantly damage consumers’ trust and confidence in the 
involved brands. In addition, Aaker, Fournier and Brasel (2004) concluded that performance-
related brand transgression will negatively impact customers’ perceived brand quality as well as 
damage customer-brand relationship. In the same vein, firm unethical conducts have also been 
found to negatively impact consumer attitude, satisfaction and purchase intentions (e.g., Schmalz 
and Orth 2012; Ingram and Taylor 2005). Overall, the literature has been unanimous on the 
negative impact of brand crises on consumer responses. 
3.3.Brand Crisis Taxonomy 
 
Along with previous studies, we conceptualized brand crises into two distinct types: 
performance-related crises and value-related crises (Pullig et al. 2006). Performance-related 
crises generally involve defective or dangerous products that call into questions of brands’ ability 
to provide basic functional benefits. In this sense, performance-related crises mainly pertain to 
products per se (e.g., the failure of an automobile part or the detection of poisonous substance in 
food). The term “product-harm crises” has been extensively used in previous literature to refer to 
performance-related crises (e.g., Siomkos and Kurzbard 1994; Dawar and Pillutla 2000; Cleeren 
11 
 
et al. 2013). On the contrary, value-related crises do not involve any functionality-level attributes. 
Rather, value-related crises mainly pertain to firm unethical or non-social responsible behaviors 
that go beyond products per se (e.g., discrimination in workplace or violation of environmental 
regulations) (Huber et al. 2009; Dutta and Pullig 2011). In general, performance-related crises 
mainly impact brands’ expected functional benefits whereas value-related crises mostly impact 
brands’ expected symbolic and psychological benefits (Pullig et al. 2006; Dutta and Pullig 2011). 
This taxonomy is also consistent with Keller’s (1993) conceptualization on brand equity where 
functional benefits and symbolic benefits are distinguished at brand level. Similar with our 
categorization, Trump’s (2014) recent research on brand transgression also classified brand 
misdeeds into product versus ethical transgressions. Though labelled differently, the mechanism 
of categorization is essentially the same.  
Although in reality, some crises may reside in the grey areas involving both product 
defects and firm unethical behaviors (e.g., dangerous products combined with unethical cover-
ups), we treat brand crises as two distinct categories in this thesis, either as performance-related 
or value-related crises. We believe it’s important to first examine the most distinct qualitative 
differences in these two different types of crises contexts in order to advance our understanding 
of the negative brand publicity literature. 
 Performance and value-related crisis have been examined separately in previous literature. 
Specifically, product-harm crisis (i.e., performance related crisis) has been put under academic 
spotlight recently due to its increasing occurrence, whereas value-related crisis has received 
relatively less academic attention (Ahluwalia et al. 2000; Dawar and Pillutla 2000; Cleeren et al. 
2008; Chen et al. 2009; Darke et al. 2010; Ingram and Taylor 2005; Schmalz and Orth 2012). 
However, there is a scarcity of studies that have examined both types of crisis. Two exceptions 
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are Trump’s study on connected consumers’ responses to product versus ethical transgressions 
and Dutta and Pullig’s (2011) examination on consumers’ responses to firm response strategies 
in performance versus value related crisis. In this thesis, we are interested in how brand equity 
and crisis type along with other contingent factors influence consumers’ reactions to the crisis-
associated brands. 
3.4. Buffering Perspective 
 
 Traditional literature on brand crises as well as product and service failure has mainly 
supported a “buffering” perspective. That is, researchers have identified a variety of consumer 
and brand characteristics that can help to insulate an erring brand from negative consumer 
responses. This line of research indicates that brand equity may indeed be an asset in a brand 
harm crisis. For example, using experiment procedure, Rea et al. (2014) showed that there is 
smaller loss in consumer perceptions for a high-equity brand than for a low-equity brand in a 
product-harm crisis. They argued that positive brand associations of a high-equity brand often 
lead to consumers’ favorable reactions to the brand.  
In addition, Ahluwalia and her colleagues (2000) argued that brand commitment can 
provide such a buffering effect against consumers’ negative responses after a product-related 
negative publicity. Specifically, they found that highly committed consumers tend to have less 
negative responses in the face of a negative publicity. They explained that when faced with 
challenging information (i.e., product-harm crisis), highly committed consumers are more likely 
to engage into biased processing by counterarguing the negative information. But for low 
commitment consumers, they tend to have more ambivalent attitudes when exposed to negative 
information and thus revise their attitude to a greater degree. Similarly, Huber et al. (2010) 
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examined consumer-brand relationship in a brand misconduct context and they found that the 
deterioration of consumer-brand quality as well as consumer repurchase intention is smaller 
when the existing consumer-brand relationship is longer and has higher quality. 
 Brand awareness was also proved to be an important factor that can attenuate consumer 
negative reactions in a performance-related crisis. For example, Ho-Dac et al. (2013) recently 
examined the effect of online customer review and found that brand awareness can provide a 
safety cushion against negative online customer review to a certain degree such that sales suffer 
less for a well-known brand in the face of negative online customer review. In addition, in a 
study where country of manufacture (COM) effect has also been examined in a product-harm 
crisis context, Laufer et al. (2009) showed that negative COM will negatively impact brand 
evaluation in a product harm crisis, such that consumers tend to attribute more blame to the 
erring brand and downgrade their evaluations. However, this negative COM effect only exhibits 
when an unknown brand is involved in a crisis, while a well-known brand is immune to the 
negative COM effect. This implies that well-known brands can enjoy certain reputation shield in 
the wake of a product-harm crisis. 
 Moreover, corporate reputation has also been demonstrated in several studies to provide a 
shield against negative consumer responses in a performance-related crisis. For example, In 
Siomkos and Kurzbard’s (1994) pioneering study on product-harm crisis, they found that 
consumers’ purchase intention after a product-harm crisis is less damaged when the product is 
sold by a company with good reputation. Consumers also perceive the products as less harmful 
when the erring company has better reputations. Similarly, Grunwald and Hempelmann (2010) 
examined the role of corporate reputation for quality in product-harm crisis context using an 
online experimental study and they found that a good reputation for quality can provide some 
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protection and attenuate the blame assigned to the involved manufacturer. They applied 
cognitive dissonance theory to explain the buffering effect, arguing that consumers are motivated 
to resolve cognitive dissonance by selectively processing or re-interpreting the dissonant 
information. Consistent with the mainstream corporate reputation literature asserting that 
“reputational capital” can protect a firm against the negative consequences from negative 
publicity, Decker (2012) further found that both firm’s perceived trustworthiness and level of 
expertise, two key components of corporate reputation construct, can attenuate the harm suffered 
from negative publicity. 
 Though the brand equity construct was not specifically tested, several previous studies 
did show that a strong brand can provide some protection against the negative effects from a 
product-harm crisis. Analyzing scanner data before and after the 1996 Kraft peanut butter crisis 
in Australia, Cleeren et al. (2008) found that the stronger brand Kraft regained its market share 
more quickly than the weak brand Eta. More specifically, their model showed that pre-crisis 
loyalty and familiarity can provide a direct buffer against the negative effects from the product 
recall, and the stronger brand Kraft also enjoyed a more effective post-crisis advertising than its 
counterpart Eta. They argued that loyal consumers who are familiar with the brand are more 
likely to give the erring brand the benefits of doubt and discount the diagnosticity of the negative 
information, leading to the direct buffering effect. Consistent with this buffering perspective, 
based on a field survey and two laboratory experiments, Dawar and Pillutla (2000) showed that 
consumers revise their attitude less in the face of a product-harm crisis when they initially have 
strong positive expectations about the crisis-associated brand and this finding is robust across the 
continuum of firm response strategies. They argued that people are more likely to engage in 
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confirmatory bias to maintain their prior positive attitude to minimize cognitive dissonance from 
the negative information. 
 Some less commonly studied factors have also been proven to provide a buffering effect 
under performance-related crisis. For example Lei and his colleagues (2012) identified that when 
a product-harm crisis happens, consumers place less blame towards the brand that they have 
positive prior beliefs. But this buffering effect is contingent on the availability of base-rate 
information and similarity information. They argued that information inconsistency occurs when 
positive prior beliefs encounter negative information, and to resolve such inconsistency, 
consumers tend to seek information (i.e., base-rate and similarity information) to help refute the 
negative (e.g., product-harm crisis) information (Edward and Smith 1996; Kunda 1990). And 
when they succeed in gathering information and construct reasonable refutations, buffering effect 
occurs. One of the premises for their observed buffering effect is when the product-harm crisis 
happens to a strong brand to which consumers have positive prior beliefs. In the same vein, 
Pullig et al. (2006) have identified another attitudinal dimension that can help to insulate 
consumer negative responses from negative publicity. They proposed that attitude certainty (i.e., 
the strength of an initial attitude) will moderate consumer responses in regards with negative 
publicity. Specifically, they argued that people with high attitude certainty are more likely to 
engage into defensive mechanisms to protect their initial attitude against negative information 
whereas people hold weak attitude certainty tend to process the negative information in a 
relatively objective manner and change their attitude accordingly.  
Although performance and service failures are not considered as brand crisis in our 
research, the phenomenon does resemble the negative publicity situations. Therefore, literature 
on this area should be able to provide some valuable insights and guidance about brand crisis 
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phenomenon. The mainstream researches on performance and service failure also support a 
buffering perspective. For example, Laczniak et al. (2001) revealed that when faced with product 
failures (i.e., computer problems), consumers attributed more blame to the company in the 
unknown brand condition, but they assigned more blame to the users when a well-known brand 
is involved. They argued that a prior positive attitude will weaken the persuasiveness of the 
negative information. Adding to the buffering perspective, Huang (2011) showed that after a 
service failure, service recovery is more effective in restoring consumer satisfaction and 
behavioral intentions when the erring service provider has higher brand equity. Similarly, Choi 
and Mattila (2008) investigated how consumers’ prior expectation about service quality impacts 
their responses after a service failure encounter before any recovery strategies, and they found 
that high service quality expectation can shield the erring service provider against the negative 
consumer responses. In addition, Cowart et al. (2014) examined religious affiliation’s effect on 
consumer responses to a service failure and observed a buffering effect of religious affiliation. 
That is, consumers tend to be more forgiving about a service failure when the service providers 
have religious associations. Recently, Liao and Cheng (2013; 2014) investigated brand equity’s 
effect in a product innovation failure context. They showed that brand equity can shield the 
adverse effect of product innovation failure to certain extent. They explained the buffering effect 
by arguing that consumers’ prior strong quality perceptions about a strong brand can serve as an 
anchor, dragging post-failure brand evaluation towards the positive end. 
This buffering effect is further supported beyond brand crisis context. For example, Klein 
and Ahluwalia (2005) found that in evaluating political candidates, voters who like a candidate 
already are immune to the established negativity effect (i.e. people weigh negative information 
more heavily than positive information). They argued that even a weak liking or preference is 
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enough to provoke a consistency motivation such that voters will process the negative 
information in a biased manner to discount the relevance or diagnosticity of the negative 
information. 
 Although there are ample literatures supporting the buffering perspective, very few of the 
studies actually examined the specific construct of brand equity in a valid brand crisis context. 
Moreover, this buffering effect is exclusively observed in performance-related crisis context, 
implying that such a buffering effect may be constrained to performance-related crisis. 
3.5. Amplifying Perspective 
 
 Although researchers in brand crisis context mostly focus on identifying key drivers to 
fend off the negative effects from a brand crisis, some recent studies have started to look at the 
phenomenon from the opposite perspective, that is, they are trying to understand what factors 
will make a brand especially vulnerable to a brand crisis. This stream of research mainly 
supports an “amplifying” perspective and emphasizes on the dark side of various consumer and 
brand characteristics. 
 Seo and Jang (2013) examined the role of brand equity in food crises and observed such 
an “amplifying” effect. They found larger deterioration in consumers’ visit intention for crisis-
associated restaurants with high brand equity. They used the “love becomes hate effect” to 
explain the phenomenon, arguing that long-standing consumers feel more intensively betrayed in 
a brand crisis context. Consistent with this amplifying perspective, using a scenario-based 
multistage choice experiment, Korkofings and Ang (2011) found that a product recall damage a 
well-known brand to a greater extent than an unknown brand in regard with brand equity and 
future product choice. They argued that instead of discounting the negative information, 
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consumers feel especially disappointed and betrayed when a strong brand issues a recall. In the 
same vein, using data on automobile recalls in the U.S. market from 1975 to 1999, Rhee and 
Haunschild (2006) demonstrated that reputation for quality can be a liability such that 
automobile firms with high quality reputation suffers more in regards of market share loss. They 
argued that consumers have high expectations about products manufactured by high-reputation 
firms and they become especially disappointed when a product recall occurs. In addition, 
problems from highly reputable firms tend to attract more media attention. 
Further supporting the amplifying effect, Berger et al. (2010) revealed that brand 
awareness can be a liability when negative publicity occurs. Specifically, using econometric 
analysis as well as experimental studies, they showed that negative publicity hurt sales of well-
known brands but benefit the unknown brands. They argued that negative publicity increases the 
awareness of an unknown brand and thus increases sales. But a well-known brand cannot take 
advantage of the potential increase in brand awareness due to a ceiling effect from its already 
high brand awareness and therefore suffers from the negativity effect from the negative 
information. Along with the same logic, Fennis and Stroebe (2014) examined the effectiveness 
of self-disclosure versus third-party disclosure of negative information in a brand crisis, and they 
found that self-disclosure of negative information is more effective in restoring consumers’ 
attitude, perceived company trustworthiness as well as behavioral intentions, but with the 
positive effect only constrained to firms with poor prior reputation. They argued that this effect is 
explained by the increased company trustworthiness for poor brands, while a good brand suffers 
from a ceiling effect of its prior high trustworthiness. 
In addition, Puzakova et al. (2013) examined the role of brand anthropomorphization in 
product-harm crises and they found that consumers have more negative brand evaluations for 
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humanized brand amid product wrongdoing. They argued that consumers perceive humanized 
brands as capable of having their own intentions and therefore assign more responsibility to the 
crisis-associated brand in a product-harm crisis. Beyond the B2C domain, Chandrashekaran and 
his colleagues showed that customers who have better relationship aspects (i.e., length of 
relationship, volume of business, and favorability of prior experience) are more sensitive and 
vulnerable to problems and are more likely to defect despite of their alleged high satisfaction 
level in business-to-business context. 
Though most of the studies support a buffering effect in product and service failure 
literature, the findings are not conclusive. There is another stream of studies supporting an 
opposite amplifying effect (Laczniak 2001; Choi and Mattila 2008; Huang 2011). For example, 
Grégoire and Fisher (2008) found a “love becomes hate” effect after a service failure and poor 
recovery. That is, they observed that high relationship quality customers feel more betrayed and 
tend to engage in retaliation behavior to a greater extent when they feel a violation of fairness 
norm. Using two laboratory experiments, Roehm and Brady (2007) exposed participants to food 
delivery failure scenarios and found that performance failure hurts high-equity brand to a greater 
extent than a low-equity brand. Their explanation is that high-equity brand has significant stature 
to lose and consumers’ prior high expectations may backfire in the wake of performance failure. 
On the other hand, a low-equity brand has nothing to lose and consumer disappointment is 
mitigated due to non-existing prior expectations.  
One thing worth mentioning is that unlike literature buttressing a buffering effect, the 
amplifying effect is not exclusively limited to performance-related crisis. Cooksey and Kuchina-
Musina (2010) investigated public’s perception regarding firm ethical decisions in both small 
and large business. They found that public is generally less concerned about ethical decisions of 
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small business compared with large ones and people actually favor small unknown business than 
large well-established ones in the wake of ethical dilemmas. The same boomerang effect has also 
been observed in firm ethical transgressions. Trump (2014) found that highly connected 
consumers tend to perceive firm ethical transgression as especially negative and diagnostic, and 
consequently downgrade their evaluations to a greater extent. 
3.6. Contingency Perspective 
 
 The conflicting findings from the above two streams of research fail to answer our main 
research question – is brand equity an asset or a liability in a brand harm crisis context? Will 
consumers defend against negative information when the involved brand has high brand equity, 
leading to the buffering effect, or will they feel especially disappointed about a high-equity brand, 
leading to the amplifying effect? It seems that a contingency perspective may provide the long 
sought answer. Originally used in organizational studies, contingency theory suggests that there 
is no single best way to achieve the optimal fit between organizational factors. It emphasizes the 
multivariate nature of a phenomenon and is aimed to understand the interactions among 
organizational factors (Kast and Rosenzweig 1973; Teo and King 1997). Therefore, this new 
stream of research in brand crisis context does not favor buffering nor amplifying explanations. 
Instead, it suggests that both effects are plausible depending on the contextual factors.  
To some extent, several recent studies on negative publicity and service failures reflect 
the contingent view. For example, using a combination of laboratory experiment and event study, 
Germann and his colleagues (2014) showed that brand commitment can attenuate consumer 
negative responses in a product recall but only when the recall is of low severity level. In a high-
severity product recall situation, brand commitment will backfire, augmenting consumer 
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negative responses. Adopting Ahluwalia’s (2000) logic, they argued that highly committed 
consumers are more likely to engage in biased processing of the negative information and 
counteraruge the negative information when the product recall is of low severity level, leading to 
brand commitment’s buffering effect. However, when the product recall is of high severity level, 
the negative information becomes difficult to counterargue and biased processing is impeded. 
They used Oliver’s (1993) disconfirmation-expectancy paradigm to argue that highly committed 
consumers will become especially disappointed in the face of a severe product recall and the 
intensified incongruity lead to augmented consumer negative responses.  
Similarly, Einwiller et al. (2006) also identified crisis severity as a contingency variable. 
They examined the role of consumer-company identification in the negative publicity context 
and they found that identification can only attenuate the negative effects of moderately negative 
information but does not mitigate the effects of extremely negative publicity. Drawing from 
Kunda’s (1990) motivated reasoning theory, they argued that strongly identified consumers are 
motivated to protect their initial attitudes and tend to engage in defensive processing. However, 
the extremely negative information is highly diagnostic and difficult to counterargue, therefore 
defensive information processing is impeded and the safety cushion from strong identification no 
longer exists. Hess Jr. (2008) investigated the effect of firm reputation for service quality on 
consumer responses to service failures and he found the same result. That is, a buffering effect 
was observed in their experimental study such that consumers have less negative responses when 
the erring firm has a higher reputation for quality service. However, this buffering effect is 
attenuated with the exacerbation of service failures. 
 The contingency role of transgression severity was also observed in business-to-business 
market. In a study examining the effects of relationship commitment in a business-to-business 
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context, Ganesan et al. (2010) found that both calculative and affective commitment can provide 
a buffering effect against incumbent suppliers’ misbehaviors but only to a limited degree. When 
the transgressions become conspicuous, the relational rent from commitment can no longer 
shield the misbehaving supplier and will even backfire when the incumbent supplier is involved 
in flagrant opportunism. They explained this phenomenon using the assimilation and contrast 
framework from social judgment theory, arguing that when the transgression are mild, the 
misbehaviors will be assimilated to the previous attitude anchor and be perceived as less of a 
transgression. But when a stimulus is sufficiently discrepant from the previous anchor (i.e., a 
severe transgression), a contrast effect will occur, leading to intensified adverse effect from the 
misbehavior. In the same vein, Antia and Frazier (2001) also observed the similar buffering and 
amplifying effects in a franchising relationship context. When relationship is of high quality, 
franchisors are more tolerant of franchisees’ violations and tend to exert less severe enforcement 
responses. However, this relationship rent will backfire when transaction specific violations are 
involved. That is, when a transgression is outrageous and interfirm interactions are more 
cooperative, franchisors tend to enforce harsh sanctions. 
 In addition, the contingency role of crisis severity has also been proved in value-related 
crisis. For example, Ingram et al. (2005) found that highly committed consumers tend to forgive 
a firm’s unethical marketing behaviors when the perceived harm is low, but they become 
especially disappointed and the negative responses intensified when the perceived harm is high 
from the firm unethical behavior. They explained that when the magnitude of harm increases, 
consumers are more likely to feel an act of unfair and no longer can defend the erring brand 
regardless of their commitment level. In the same logic, Schmalz and Orth (2012) demonstrated 
that consumer brand attachment can provided a buffering effect against firm unethical behaviors, 
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but only when the negative information is moderately rather than extremely negative. They drew 
from motivated reasoning theory, arguing that highly attached consumers are more likely to 
engage into defensive reactions and discount the negative information, but this defensive ability 
will lose its magic power when the negative information becomes too diagnostic too discount 
(Kunda 1990). 
 Except for crisis severity, other contingency variables have also been identified in 
previous brand crisis literature. Using two scenario-based experiments, Brady and his colleagues 
(2008) examined the role of brand equity in a performance failure context, and they found 
consistent result that high brand equity can lead to more favorable customer satisfaction and 
behavioral intentions in both product and service failure scenarios. However, consumers 
downgrade brand evaluations to a greater extent immediately after a failure episode. Their 
findings indicate that whether brand equity is an asset or liability in a performance failure 
context is contingent on the timing of evaluation. Klein and Dawar (2004) found that firm’s 
corporate social responsibility level can also work as a reservoir of goodwill in a product-harm 
crisis, effectively attenuating consumer negative evaluations. Using attribution theory, they 
argued that consumers assign less blame to firms with high CSR levels in a product-harm crisis, 
but this buffering effect is contingent on whether consumers are CSR sensitive. In a similar vein, 
Vanhamme and Grobben (2009) verified firm CSR involvement history as another contingency 
variable. They found that firm CSR involvement can help to protect companies against the 
negative effects from negative publicity only when firms have long CSR involvement history, 
while a short CSR history may backfire due to consumer skepticism. In addition, other factors 
such as crisis relevance, gender, processing style as well as brand personality have all been 
identified to work as contingency variables, moderating consumers’ responses to negative crisis 
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information (Dawar and Lei 2009; Laufer and Gillespie 2004; Monga and John 2008; Aaker et al. 
2004).  
3.7.Summary 
 
 Previous studies have examined the role of various factors in a brand crisis context, such 
as brand commitment, familiarity, expectation, attitude certainty as well as reputation, yet the 
role of an important marketing construct, customer-based brand equity, in a non-routine brand 
crisis context has rarely been explored. Although there are a few studies that examined the role 
of brand equity in a crisis context, they all suffer from some limitations that will constrain our 
understanding in this important phenomenon. For example, Seo and Jang (2013) studied  brand 
equity’s effect in restaurant food crisis and Rea et al. (2014) examined the role of brand equity in 
personal computer industry, yet both studies failed to address the complexity of brand equity 
effect. Another exception is Brady and his colleagues’ (2008) study on brand equity’s effect in a 
performance failure context, yet their phenomenon was not directly related to the key domain of 
brand harm crisis. 
We reviewed the three major streams of research in the brand crisis literature and the 
relevant findings are far from consensus. On one hand, brand equity may provide a buffering 
effect as consumers may engage into biased processing and discount the negative information 
towards a strong brand. On the other hand, brand equity may also lead to an amplifying effect 
because consumers tend to feel especially disappointed due to their high expectation about a 
good brand. In addition, the role of brand equity in crisis context may also be contingent on other 
contextual factors such as crisis severity or crisis type. While the extant literature provides 
important insights and perspectives, we feel that a baseline ground work is needed to lay the 
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conceptual foundation of both the buffering and amplifying effects in relation to brand equity, 
crisis type, and crisis severity. In turn, we conduct focus group studies which aim to gain a better 
understanding of the role of brand equity in a brand harm crisis context. 
4. FOCUS GROUP STUDY 
 
In the focus group studies, we intend to gain some preliminary insights as to whether 
brand equity is an asset or a liability and how consumers may respond differently to the same 
crisis that happens to different brands. In so doing, we attempt to address the boundary 
conditions that would restrict brand equity’s effect and explain why. The purpose of the focus 
group study is to provide some baseline information and insights concerning our theoretical 
framework and hypotheses development.  
Given the complex nature of brand harm crises, a qualitative study is a natural approach 
to gain some insights and provide some preliminary answers to the aforementioned concerns 
(Shah and Corley 2006). According to Qualitative Research Consultant’s Association (2014), 
qualitative research is designed to reveal how people behave and why they behave as they do. 
Though descriptive in nature, this type of research can be very useful in testing alternative ideas 
as well as allowing new or unanticipated ideas to be explored (Green and Thorogood 2013). In 
addition, qualitative research study has been widely proved to be an effective preliminary 
method to facilitate the design of survey instruments in quantitative research (Hair et al. 2006). 
The purpose of the qualitative study in our research is to gain some insights about the 
inconclusive role of brand equity in a brand crisis context, to identify new contingent conditions, 
as well as to facilitate our hypotheses development and experiment design. 
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 Focus group approach is used as the data collection method for our qualitative study. It is 
essentially an interactive group discussion on a predetermined topic by a small group of 
participants and guided by a facilitator (Bristol and Fern 2003). Unlike traditional group 
interviews, instead of the interviewer asking each participant to answer a question in turn, 
participants in a focus group are encouraged to discuss with each other regarding topics that 
interest the researcher. That is, focus group is based on group discussion and interaction rather 
than individual participant’s comments (Kitzinger 1995). And this “group effect” is the 
distinctive strength of focus group such that it helps researchers to tap into the group dynamics 
and generate richer and deeper data than one-to-one interviews. It makes a focus group more 
than the sum of separate individual interviews. This “group effect” is manifested by participants’ 
query and explanations to each other in a group setting, which offers valuable information about 
the consensus and diversity within the group (Morgan 1996). Therefore, focus group should be 
especially useful when addressing complex behaviors and motivations in a social context. And 
this is exactly the reason we choose focus group method in this research because negative brand 
publicity falls into this type of context.  Consumers often have very conflicting beliefs and 
motivations when faced with negative information and the mass media coverage on brand crises 
renders the social dimension on this research topic particularly salient (Ahluwalia et al. 2000; 
Rhee and Haunschild 2006). Therefore, focus group method fits our research context well and 
it’s considered as an appropriate method in this research.  
Although Merton (1987) criticized that cause-effect relations cannot be made based on 
the evidence from focus group studies due to small sample size and unreliable results, and Bristol 
and Fern (2003) argued that focus group discussion may lead to a “polarization effect” – 
people’s attitude become more extreme after group discussion, the usage of focus group in our 
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research should be largely immune to these shortcomings. The application of focus group in this 
thesis is limited to early, exploratory stage such as hypotheses development and experimental 
design, so the verification on cause-effect relations as well as the measurement on attitude are 
left out from this focus group study and will be tested in the following experiment studies. 
Therefore, the potential problems of focus group method should not pose a serious threat to our 
research. 
4.1.Focus Group Procedure 
 
In this research, we conducted two focus groups with 19 participants, with each group 
consisting of ten and nine participants respectively. All respondents were recruited through an 
online research participation system or through flyers posted on campus at a Canadian university. 
Since the target is general consumers, there are no specific restrictions or criteria on the 
recruitment of participants. The participants were recruited through a four week period in the 
summer of 2014 and the two sessions were conducted over a two week period in a seminar room 
at a Canadian University during the same summer. The discussion lasted for approximately 1.5 – 
2 hours for the two sessions respectively.  After each session, subjects were debriefed. 
Participants either received $10 cash or extra course credit for introductory marketing courses as 
a token of compensation for their time. In addition, dinner is served after each session and a $20 
valued gift card is also distributed to one of the participant within each group based on fair 
drawing as an additional incentive. The average age of the participants was 25.3 years, ranging 
from 19 – 51 years of age. In terms of gender, there were 10 females and 9 males in attendance. 
Participants also come from a diverse cultural background with 31% Canadian and 69% 
international students from seven different countries (see Table 1a and 1b). 
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–––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Insert Table 1 about Here 
–––––––––––––––––––––––– 
The design of the focus group is in accordance with previously established “rules of 
thumb”. The number of participants in each session is within the suggested number between six 
and ten to ensure the group is large enough to gain a broad perspective as well as small enough 
to avoid disorder. Although it has been suggested to keep participants in each group with the 
same gender, age range and cultural backgrounds to ensure that participants feel comfortable 
discussing with each other, it should not be a serious problem that we randomly split participants 
into two groups because group homogeneity was expected to be maintained by using a student 
sample (Morgan 1997). As suggested by Morgan (1998), one moderator facilitated the discussion 
and one research assistant was present to help distribute materials along the discussion as well as 
taking notes. In conformity to Kitzinger’s (1995) suggestions on focus group design, a semi-
structured question route with open-ended questions was developed to guide the focus group 
discussion covering topics such as participants’ reactions to various real and fictitious brand 
crisis scenarios; their experiences and thoughts in a brand crisis context; attributions they made 
in different brand crisis scenarios; and factors important in evaluating a brand crisis (see 
Appendix 1). 
The study was approved by the university’s research ethic board, and all the participants 
signed informed consent prior to focus group participation. To the best of our knowledge, there 
were no evident conflicts of interest in regards with the planning, conduct, analysis, or the 
interpretation of the study results. In each session, participants were first welcomed and the 
moderator introduced the conventions of focus group study to participants. Then under the 
guidance of the moderator, they were encouraged to talk about their experiences and thoughts 
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about any brand crisis they can think of as well as some real and fictitious brand crises prepared 
by the researcher (see Appendix 2). The discussion lasted for about 2 hours in the first session 
and 1.5 hours in the second session. At the end of each session, participants were debriefed and 
were specifically directed to the fictitious crisis article and told that it was made up by the 
researcher. 
–––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Insert Table 2 about Here 
–––––––––––––––––––––––– 
The discussion for both groups were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim with the 
knowledge of the participants, resulting in a 212 minutes audiotape and a 21,836 words, 67 pages 
document as the basis for our analysis. The data was thematically coded and analyzed by the 
researcher (Boyatzis 1998). The transcript was then repeatedly reviewed to make sure all the 
themes and patterns in regards with our research interest are covered. Three major themes related 
to our research interest emerged upon analysis and the following discussion will proceed based 
on the three themes – brand equity, crisis type and crisis severity. Some peripheral findings are 
also discussed after the three major themes. To clearly illustrate the findings, verbatim 
anonymous quotes will be used in the discussion. Pseudo names are used for the quotes to 
protect participants’ privacy. 
 
4.2.Focus Group Results 
4.2.1. The Role of Brand Equity 
 
 Comparing participants’ responses towards similar crises happened to low- versus high-
equity brands, the results strongly suggest that respondents reacted very differently towards 
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different brands in a brand crisis context. The “buffering” perspective is supported in the finding, 
such that participants are more likely to perceive the same crisis happened to a good brand as 
less severe and relevant, attribute the problem to external factors outside the crisis-associated 
brand and perceive the transgression as a one-time anomaly. In contrast with a low-end brand, 
respondents tend to defend a reputable brand and list more cogent counterarguments against the 
negative information. For example, when discussing about a potential fire hazard problem with 
Sony: 
 
“And you don’t know whether it’s the electric circuit’s problem. I mean, it could be the TV’s 
fault, but the news doesn’t consider other factors such as the electric outlets plugged into. So, 
I guess it just looks at one side of the story.” (Olivia, 22) 
 
“I think it’s just something unfortunate happened. It’s just an accident. I mean Sony is a 
fairly reputable brand. The bottom line is I don’t think their products are of poor quality. So I 
think it’s just a bad day for Sony.” (Alice, 51) 
 
However, in another session where participants were exposed to the same fire hazard on a 
different brand – Insignia, they had very different responses: 
 
“I’m not surprised at all cuz (because) I always think Insignia has crappy products. So it’s 
just getting another recall. I mean, they don’t even have a TV plant. They just outsource 
everything and have poor quality control.” (Jacob, 24) 
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 This finding is within our expectations. As aforementioned in the literature review, 
literature on negative publicity has examined some related constructs such as brand commitment, 
consumer-brand identification, and reputation for quality as well as for corporate social 
responsibility, and a buffering perspective has been largely supported (Ahluwalia et al. 2000; 
Einwiller et al. 2006; Grunwald and Hempelmann 2010; Klein and Dawar 2004).  
However, participants did not reach consensus regarding brand equity’s buffering effect. 
Our findings also indicate that there might be some boundaries constraining the buffering effect 
from high-equity brand. In some situations (e.g., BWM’s recall due to safety issues and Apple’s 
price fixing scandal), participants stopped defending strong brands and started express strong 
disappointments: 
 
“It strikes me really hard that BMW also has this kind of safety problems. It is known as a 
German brand and German brands are known as superior to American brands. I mean their 
products are not cheap. We pay a huge premium price for the feeling of safety. I can 
understand if the problem happened to Toyota, but for BMW, it’s totally unacceptable.”  
(Alex, 27) 1 
 
“I didn’t think Apple would do such a thing, to be honest. I think Apple is a(n) elite, 
reputable brand. You know, you pay good money for good quality, so I didn’t expect them to 
do something out of respect like this. I mean for a different company I can understand, but 
not Apple. I am very surprised.” (Ashley, 23)2 
 
                                                            
1 This comment is based on a real news video about BMW’s recall. Video is accessible online 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jJ0PRFHEhwo 
2 This comment is based on a real news video about Apple’s price fixing scandal. Video is accessible online 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ckv5nBGuJs8 
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 In summary, based on the findings from focus group study, it turns out that overall brand 
equity does provide a safety cushion against the negative effects from a brand crisis to some 
extent. However, the buffering effect is not without limitations. The findings suggest that 
participants’ negative reactions may intensify for a good brand in some situations, indicating the 
existence of some important contingency variables (e.g., crisis severity and crisis type). 
4.2.2. The Role of Crisis Severity 
 
 Crisis severity is one of the most commented topics in the discussion session. Participants 
tend to evaluate a crisis based on the seriousness of the wrongdoing. Consistent with intuition, 
participants have stronger negative responses and feelings when they perceive a crisis as more 
severe. This finding is also in accordance with previous literatures on service failure and 
relational transgressions in B2B environment (Hess Jr. 2008; Ganesan et al. 2010). More 
specifically, participants indicated that they perceived a crisis as especially severe when the crisis 
involves deaths: 
 
 “So I guess when it involves human lives, people take is more seriously.” (Olivia, 22) 
 
“It’s kind of sad. I mean fatality always has a huge impact on me. I guess it’s just more eye-
catching and more impactful.” (Emma, 21) 
 
 Another finding regarding crisis severity is that participants are less likely to defend any 
brand against a very severe crisis. They tend to attribute the problem exclusively to the involved 
company regardless of other contextual factors. This is also in line with prior literature. In 
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investigating the role of consumer-company identification in negative publicity context, 
Einwiller et al. (2006) also argued that extremely negative information can be highly diagnostic 
and people find highly diagnostic information difficult to counterargue even if they are 
motivated to do so. In addition, our finding suggests that even when participants can find some 
excuses for the crisis-associated brand, the defensive arguments can barely reverse their negative 
opinions: 
 
“I don’t want this wield, mysterious meat from Maple Leaf after its listeriosis outbreak. It’s 
so disgusting and scary. Now I have very negative opinion even though I know that it 
happened to hundreds of companies before. But just knowing that, oh my god, I don’t want 
this chicken” (Thomas, 25) 
 
 To summarize, our findings suggest that consumers will have extremely negative 
opinions and feelings towards a brand when an extremely severe crisis happened, especially 
when it involves death. Under this situation, consumers are unlikely to defend the erring brand, 
and even they do, the defensive move may not be able to mitigate their negative responses. This 
indicates that crisis severity may serve as an important contingent condition in examining the 
role of brand equity in a brand crisis context. 
4.2.3. The Role of Crisis Type 
 
 The scarcity of literature on value-related crisis is one of the major reasons that we 
conducted this exploratory focus group study. That is, one of the purposes of this study is to 
understand how consumers respond differently in a performance-related versus value-related 
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crisis. First, we found that participants perceive most value-related crises as less personally 
relevant and severe: 
 
“If something affects me as a person, like Maple Leaf happened 8 or 9 years ago, or the cars, 
I think it was Toyota, they stay with you. But the copyright problem, that’s not gonna stay 
with me.” (Matthew, 24) 
 
Second, unlike in performance-related crises, participants are unlikely to defend against 
the negative information in a value-related crisis. They tend to accept the negative information at 
face value and attribute the fault entirely to the involved brand. Folkes and Kamins (1999) also 
argued that ethical information is perceived as more diagnostic than product attribute information. 
In addition, some participants expressed a feeling of betrayal when a brand is involved in an 
unethical conduct: 
 
“I remember when Common Beauty said they do not test on animals but actually they are 
lying. I felt like they betrayed us. It’s just so disgusting. They are full of lies, so dishonest. I 
just don’t want any products from this brand anymore.” (Sarah, 22) 
 
 Third, participants expressed that they expect more from a good brand than a low-end 
brand in regards with ethical conducts. Respondents believe that affluent firms should take more 
social responsibilities because they are able to do so. This is in accordance with the proverb 
“with greater power comes greater responsibility”. As a result, subjects expressed that they felt 
especially disappointed when a high-equity brand is involved in a value-related crisis: 
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“Well, although it is true that every company should stick to the same ethic criteria, I think in 
reality, it just comes natural that you will expect more from a premium brand like Sony. I 
mean if Sony cannot meet the ethic standard, I would not expect other brands to do it.” 
(Ryan, 31)3 
 
 Overall, the findings suggest that consumers may respond to different types of crises 
differently. Whereas a buffering effect has been observed in performance-related crisis, this 
effect is no longer evident in a value-related crisis where people tend to blame an erring brand 
exclusively. This indicates that crisis type may serve as another contingent condition in 
examining the role of brand equity in negative publicity context. 
4.2.4. Other Findings  
 
 First, participants indicate that a brand crisis almost always has a negative effect on their 
opinions. This is consistent with most previous literature that negative publicity is always 
devastating, damaging a variety of marketing measurements (Van Heerde et al. 2007). Although 
sometimes respondents started defending an erring brand and blamed other parties for the fault, 
they did mention that the involved brand should still be responsible for the problem: 
 
“Yes, maybe the technology is not mature when they produced the products, maybe the 
media exaggerates the problem. But at the end of the day, they are the ones who produced 
the products, so I guess they should take responsibility after all.” (Megan, 19)4 
 
                                                            
3 This comment is based on a fictitious newspaper article about Sony’s poor labor practice (see Appendix 2) 
4 This comment is based on a real news video about BMW’s recall. Video is accessible online 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jJ0PRFHEhwo 
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 Second, some participants questioned the validity of a product recall as a crisis. While a 
product recall is portrayed as a negative publicity in the focus group, respondents raised the 
concern that a product recall can also be perceived as positive in which a company handled a 
potential problem responsibly, especially when a recall is voluntary.  
 
“Well, according to me, the time when they sell the cars they haven’t identified there are 
some faulty parts on the cars. Later on, they fixed the problem and recalled the cars. Well, it 
doesn’t sound like negative news to me. I would say this company is responsible.” (Tylor, 
27)5 
 
Third, the more common a problem is perceived to happen in the whole industry, either 
performance or value-related, the less likely participants will blame the involved company and 
consequently the less negatively they will perceive the crisis information. Lei et al. (2013) have 
identified base-rate information (i.e., how common a focal behavior is among the population of 
interest) as an important factor in moderating consumers’ blame attribution in negative publicity 
context.  
 
“I am not surprised at all. It’s just too common. I don’t even pay attention anymore. I guess 
every company is doing this, but Sony is the one who get caught. (Jessie, 24)6 
 
 Another key factor influencing participants’ responses towards a brand crisis is the way a 
company addresses the problem. Very often, the responses matter more than the problems per se. 
                                                            
5 This comment is based on a real news video about GM’s recall. Video is accessible online 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uFzk_MteN_U 
6 This comment is based on a fictitious newspaper article about Sony’s poor labor practice (see Appendix 2) 
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Post-crisis response and communication has long been established in product-harm crisis 
literature as a key driver in repairing tarnished brand evaluations (Siomkos and Kurzbard 1994; 
Pearson and Clair 1998). 
 
“I don’t think the problem with BMW cars matters to me much. What really concerns me is 
the way they respond. I have very negative feelings because it seems like they are forced to 
issue the recall. I mean, it’s common that cars have problems and get recalled. You can’t just 
stop buying cars from a brand because it has defective cars. But it’s really important how 
they respond.” (Jordan, 30)7 
 
 Although these findings are not directly related to our specific research interests, they do 
provide valuable insights and some caveats for the following experimental design. For example, 
since we are interested in examining consumers’ responses towards a brand crisis regardless of 
response strategies, how to minimize the confounding effects from inferred firm responses 
becomes an important issue in our research design. Based on the findings from focus group, at 
least we know that product recall might not be the perfect crisis scenario since it implies a 
responsible firm response. Instead, a scenario with a more inconclusive firm response should be 
preferred in the experiments. In addition, since participants perceive a highly common problem 
as not at all diagnostic (e.g., poor labor practice), such a common problem may fail to serve as a 
valid brand crisis. As per our definition on brand crisis, a valid crisis context is achieved only if 
the incident is well-publicized and can seriously threaten a brand’s key propositions. Thus we 
should avoid using overly common problem as focal crisis in the following experiments. 
                                                            
7 This comment is based on a real news video about BMW’s recall. Video is accessible online 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jJ0PRFHEhwo 
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4.3.Focus Group Discussion 
 
 Though preliminary in nature, the findings from our focus group study do provide us a 
better understanding on brand equity’s role in different brand crisis contexts. Two key potential 
boundary conditions – crisis severity and crisis type, have been identified based on the findings, 
and the insights gathered from this exploratory study also laid down the foundation for the 
following hypotheses development as well as the experimental design.  
We found preliminary evidence supporting the “buffering” perspective, that is, brand 
equity does provide some protection against consumer negative responses in certain crisis 
contexts. However, this shield from brand equity is not without limitations. Our findings also 
indicate that in some situations, brand equity’s “halo effect” may disappear or even backfire. 
This suggests the existence of some overlooked yet important boundary conditions which can 
erase or even reverse the buffering effect from brand equity in a brand crisis context.  
More importantly, we also identified two potential contingency variables deserve looking 
into – crisis severity and crisis type. According to our results, when confronted with an 
extremely negative brand crisis, consumers tend to have very negative responses and feelings, 
and the “halo effect” from a good brand seems to be no longer evident. This suggests that crisis 
severity might be one important contingent condition that moderates brand equity’s effect in a 
brand crisis context. In addition, we also observed that consumers are more likely to blame an 
erring brand and feel a sense of betrayal in a value-related crisis regardless of brand equity, 
indicating that crisis type maybe another important contingent condition, such that there might be 
qualitative difference in brand equity’s role in a performance- versus value-related crisis.  
However, it is worth noting that no cause-effect relations or any generalizations can be 
reliably made solely based on the findings from this focus group study due to small sample size 
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(Merton 1987). Therefore, we strictly limit the application of the findings from this focus group 
study to hypotheses development and experimental design. Any conclusions about causal 
relationships or hypotheses verification will be based on following experiment studies. 
5. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
 It has been well documented that consumers are “cognitive misers”, and they tend to 
minimize their cognitive effort and resort to some mental shortcuts for effortless decision making 
and judgment (Lynch et al. 1988; Petty and Krosnick 1995; Schwartz et al. 2002). Based on this 
rationale, selective information processing literature suggest that people tend to simplify their 
judgment formation and evaluation process by selectively attend to and weigh heavily on 
information consistent with prior beliefs while counterarguing or neglecting challenging 
information (Frey 1986). In the same rationale, motivated reasoning theory also contends that 
people are motivated to reach conclusions that are consistent with their prior attitudes and they 
tend to engage into biased processing to formulate illusory justifications for their desired 
conclusions (Kunda 1990). This logic is essentially the same with anchoring and adjustment 
model of belief updating which suggests that initial impressions serves as an anchor to pull 
revised beliefs towards the existing end (Smith and Bolton 1998; Hogarth and Einhorn 1992). 
Based on this logic, Judd and Brauer (1995) further suggest that extreme attitudes are less 
susceptible to persuasion attempts than less extreme attitudes, indicating that people with more 
extreme attitudes are more likely to maintain their prior attitude by selectively processing 
consistent information and discounting challenging information. Recently, Pham and 
Muthukrishnan (2002) have explored the underlying mechanism for such biased processing and 
they found that when people encounter new information that challenge their existing attitude, 
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they first search in memory for the most diagnostic and relevant pro-attitudinal information to 
defend their prior attitude. Therefore, they suggest that readily accessible pro-attitudinal 
information should help to pull judgment towards existing belief and reduce the impact of the 
inconsistent challenging information.  
Along with this rationale, because customer-based brand equity is conceptualized as 
positive and accessible brand-related knowledge in consumers’ memory, when a high-equity 
brand is under attack by negative information from a brand crisis, consumers’ prior direct or 
indirect experiences with the brand will allow them to retrieve pro-attitudinal information easily, 
which in turn will be used to dismiss the negative information from a brand crisis as much as 
possible. This defensive reaction will help to insulate a high-equity brand from consumer 
negative responses from a crisis. This logic is buttressed by most previous studies adopting the 
“buffering” perspective as we reviewed before (Dawar and Pillutla 2000; Cleeren et al. 2008;  
Brady et al. 2008). This is also consistent with the findings in the focus group study where 
participants tend to search for more excuses to counterargue the negative information when a 
high-equity brand is involved in a crisis. 
Although this biased information processing mechanism is labeled differently in previous 
studies such as assimilation, defensive bias or confirmatory bias, the mechanisms are essentially 
the same, that is, when consumers encounter negative information about a good brand, they are 
motivated to retain their prior attitude and tend to counterargue the disconfirming message 
(Sherif and Hovland 1961; Edwards and Smith 1996; Kunda 1990; Jain and Maheswaran 2000). 
 However, we recognize that brand crises are not homogeneous events and the severity of 
different brand crises can vary significantly. Previous literatures as well as findings from our 
focus group study indicate that the buffering effect from a strong brand should reach its limits 
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when the magnitude of the severity of a crisis reaches certain breaking point (e.g., Einwiller et al. 
2006; Germann et al. 2014). That is, even though consumers are motivated to defend against the 
negative information, this toleration is only up to a certain point. When the negativity of the 
information increases (i.e., a crisis becomes more severe), consumers will perceive the negative 
information as too diagnostic to counterargue and start to accept the negative information at face 
value. This is in accordance with motivated reasoning theory where Kunda (1990) denoted that 
motivated reasoning is not without constraint. She proposed that even when people are motivated 
to arrive at a particular conclusion, they still need to construct some justifications to maintain an 
illusory rationality for the desired conclusions. That is, biased processing is constrained by one’s 
ability to summon up necessary evidence to support desired conclusions. When this process fails, 
people will have to accept the undesirable conclusion at face value. Extremely negative 
information has been demonstrated to be highly diagnostic and thus it might be impossible for 
consumers to gather strong enough evidence to dismiss the extremely negative information (Herr 
et al. 1991). 
 Furthermore, we suggest that when faced with extremely negative information, not only 
will the immunizing effect from brand equity disappear, but the dark side of brand equity may 
show up. It is conceivable that consumers expect more from well-established brands due to prior 
direct or indirect positive experiences. Therefore, when a brand crisis occurs to a good brand, 
people may feel especially disappointed. On the other hand, a similar crisis on low-equity brands 
are likely to deviate away less from consumers’ relatively low expectations, thus they may be 
less upset than if they had encountered the same brand crises with high-equity brands. This 
rationale is consistent with expectancy-disconfirmation paradigm from satisfaction studies and 
gaps model of service quality (Oliver 1977; Parasuraman et al. 1985). Both theories imply that 
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customer satisfaction and perceived service quality level are negatively impacted by the gap 
between prior expectations and perceived performance.  Social judgment theory also suggests a 
similar mechanism termed contrast effect in which a subject that is largely discrepant from a 
context will be evaluated as even more deviant in the context (Sherif and Hovland 1961). Brown 
and Dacin (1997) in their classical study observed such a contrast effect, finding that poor 
product performance will be evaluated even more negative when the product is produced by a 
good brand. Further supporting this logic, literature supporting an “amplifying” perspective also 
used the disconfirmation of expectation paradigm as their key arguments (e.g., Seo and Jang 
2013; Rhee and Haunschild 2006). 
 Therefore, we suggest that crisis severity should moderate brand equity’s effect in 
influencing consumers’ responses in a brand crisis context. Specifically, we propose that brand 
equity can have both buffering and amplifying effects on consumer negative responses. While 
brand equity serves as a reservoir of goodwill in a low severity brand crisis, it should become a 
liability in a high severity brand crisis. One thing worth mentioning is that our arguments are 
essentially constrained to performance-related crisis context because previously reviewed 
literature is almost exclusively focused on performance-related crisis. Since the findings from 
our focus group study indicates that consumers may respond differently to value-related crisis, 
we will address value-related crisis context in the next section. 
 
H1: Brand equity interacts with crisis severity in influencing consumer responses, 
such that (H1a) brand equity buffers negative consumer responses in a low severity 
performance-related crisis, but (H1b) brand equity amplifies negative consumer 
responses in a high severity performance-related crisis. 
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H2: The buffering effect of brand equity in H1a is likely to be mediated by 
counterarguments, and the amplifying effect of brand equity in H1b is likely to be 
mediated by disconfirmation of expectation. 
6. EXPERIMENT 1 
  
The purpose of Experiment 1 is to test the two hypotheses proposed above. Specifically, 
we aim to investigate the role of brand equity on consumers’ responses in a performance-related 
crisis context. We expect that brand equity will attenuate consumer negative responses in a 
moderately severe performance-related crisis, but in an extremely severe condition, brand equity 
is expected to intensify consumer negative reactions. Process explanations are also examined in 
this study. 
6.1.Participants and Design 
 
 One hundred and thirty seven participants from a Canadian university participated in 
Experiment 1 for extra course credit. Subjects were recruited through an online research 
participation system and flyers posted on campus. Their mean age was 21.61 years with a range 
from 18 to 29 years. Gender was almost evenly split at 52% males and 48% females, respectively. 
The predominant ethnic origin was Caucasians at 60 percent, followed by South Asians, Asians, 
and African Americans. These demographic variables were also checked across different 
experiment conditions and no significant differences were identified. A 2 (brand equity: high 
versus low) × 2 (crisis severity: extremely severe versus moderately severe) between-subjects 
design was used in Experiment 1. Brand equity and crisis severity were manipulated. The 
manipulations were developed based on a series of pretests. 
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6.2.Stimuli Development and Pretest 
 
A pretest was conducted to identify the target product category as well as the low- and 
high-equity target brand. Forty two students (Mage = 20.83, 47.6% female) participated in a 
pretest to fill out a short questionnaire asking about their ownership of, and familiarity with 
various product categories. We also measured their perceived brand equity on various brands 
within each product category. The measurement on brand equity is adapted from existing scales 
(Yoo and Donthu 2001; Brady et al. 2008) (see Appendix 3). Based on the pretest, television was 
selected as the target product category, because students in the subject pool (introductory 
business class) were familiar with this category (Mfamiliar = 4.90/7, t(41)diff from 4 = 4.06, p < .001, 
1 = Not At All Familiar to 7 = Very Familiar). Also, thirty nine out of the forty two respondents 
indicated that they currently own a television. Television was also chosen as the target product 
category in previous literature on product-harm crisis where the use of television was justified by 
stating that the respondents were fairly familiar with this product category (e.g., Ahluwalia et al. 
2000). As for the brand equity manipulation, Sony was chosen as the high-equity brand and 
Insignia was chosen as the low equity brand (MSony = 5.76, MInsignia = 2.93; p < .001). 
 Low and high severity performance-related crisis articles were developed through a series 
of pretests. The findings from our focus group suggest that a less common crisis should be used 
to ensure the validity of a crisis context. In addition, since our research is interested in 
understanding consumers’ responses to crisis information regardless of firm response strategies, 
the crisis article should not mention or infer any firm response strategies to avoid such 
confounding effect. Thus, the performance-related crisis scenario we used was portrayed as an 
incident in which a defective part in a television can overheat and catch on fire. This is a 
relatively uncommon problem and no information regarding crisis responses was mentioned in 
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the article, either explicitly or implicitly. Since participants in the focus group study indicated 
that a crisis is perceived as more severe when it involves deaths, we manipulated crisis severity 
by varying the number of deaths and injuries involved in the incident (see Appendix 14 and 15). 
In the final pretest, 24 participants (Mage = 21.88, 54.2% female) were asked to read a recent 
newspaper article on the Global and Mail regarding a fire hazard problem with Sony. Either a 
high severity or low severity article was randomly assigned to respondents. After reading the 
target article, participants were asked to fill out a short questionnaire assessing their attitude 
towards the target news article including crisis severity, whether they perceive the article as more 
related to product performance or ethical conduct, their familiarity with, attention paid to, and 
believability of the newspaper article (see Appendix 9, 11, 12, and 13). Crisis severity was rated 
considerably higher in high severity condition than in low severity condition as intended (Mhigh = 
6.03, Mlow = 4.11; p < .01). Also, all subjects identified the target article as related to product 
performance rather than ethical conduct. In terms of the negativity about the news message, 
participants were asked to indicate to what extent they perceive the news article as negative 
towards the brand described in the article (1 = Not At All Negative, 7 = Very Negative). The 
ratings were significantly higher than the theoretical midpoint 4 for both conditions (Mhigh = 5.96, 
Mlow = 5.50; all p < .001) but does not differ in terms of extremity across the two severity 
conditions (Mhigh = 5.96, Mlow = 5.50; p > .37), indicating that the target articles were 
successfully manipulated as negative information. Moreover, the articles in both conditions were 
also rated as equivalent in familiarity (Mhigh = 2.08, Mlow = 1.91; p > .73), believability (Mhigh 
=5.08, Mlow = 5.33; p > .64), and participants’ involvement (Mhigh = 4.88, Mlow = 4.21; p > .18).  
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6.3. Experimental Procedure 
 
 Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions in a 2 (brand equity: high 
versus low) × 2 (crisis severity: extremely severe versus moderately severe) between-subjects 
design. We ran participants in small groups (from one to four participants) in a research room. 
Upon arriving at the research facility, participants were informed that they were here to 
participate in a media study conducted by business school in collaboration with department of 
communication. The purpose of the study was to evaluate some recent newspaper articles 
(Ahluwalia et al. 2000). After signing the informed consent, participants were first asked to 
provide their evaluations on five TV brands (one target brand and four filler brands). The filler 
brands served to reduce the likelihood of excessive attention focused on the target brand. 
Questions in the questionnaire included assessments on brand equity, brand attitude, brand trust 
and brand purchase intention, which were all adapted from existing scales (see Appendix 3 – 6) 
(Yoo and Donthu 2001; Brady et al. 2008; Ahluwalia et al. 2000; Dawar and Pillutla 2000; 
Puzakpva et al. 2013). Participants’ brand evaluations before exposure to target articles served as 
the baseline measurements. To control for position effects, the target brand was always in the 
third place (Mantonakis et al. 2009). The questionnaire was followed by a short filler task that 
involves some basic mathematic problems solving and it took approximately 5 minutes to 
complete (see Appendix 7). This filler task was intended to refresh participants’ working 
memory from the baseline brand evaluations to minimize one of the limitations in our study – 
close proximity between the pre- and post-test scores (Jamieson and Harkins 2011).  
Upon finishing the filler task, participants were interrupted by the researcher and were 
asked to read the target newspaper article from one of the four manipulation conditions 
(Ahluwalia et al. 2000). In the high brand-equity condition, the target brand is Sony, whereas in 
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the low brand-equity condition, the target brand is Insignia. Televisions overheating and catching 
on fire was used as the crisis scenario and crisis severity was manipulated by varying the number 
of deaths and injuries associated with the incidents (see Appendix 14 and 15). After reading the 
news articles, participants were asked to finish another booklet assessing their cognitive 
responses about the target article, followed by the dependent variables measures and 
manipulation check variables measures (Ahluwalia et al. 2000; 2002; Roehm and Brady 2007; 
Pullig et al. 2006) 
Finally, participants were administered a suspicion probe and none of the participants 
guessed the purpose of our study. The suspicion check combined with a between-subject design 
effectively reduced the likelihood of demand effect (Shimp, Hyatt and Snyder, 1991). After 
finishing a brief section on demographic information, participants were debriefed and a feedback 
form regarding our research purpose was provided. They were specifically directed back to the 
target article in the booklet and told it was made up by the researcher for research purpose only 
(Ahluwalia et al. 2000). 
6.4. Dependent Measures 
 
 Brand attitude was measured using five seven-point semantic differential scales 
(good/bad, favorable/unfavorable, like/dislike, pleasant/unpleasant, and desirable/undesirable; 
αpre = .971, αpost = .971) adapted from previous scales (Ahluwalia et al. 2000; Puzakova 2013). A 
mean attitude score was computed to be used in the analysis. In accordance with Ahluwalia and 
her colleagues’ method, attitude change was computed as the difference8 between the baseline 
                                                            
8 Measuring attitude change as a difference raises the issue of whether the difference scores are reliable. Recent 
research (e.g., Collins 1996) has revealed that difference scores are unreliable only when the pretest (x) and post-test 
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mean attitude and the post-crisis mean attitude for each subject. More specifically, attitude 
change was computed by subtracting post-crisis mean attitude from the baseline mean attitude. 
Specific scales are listed in Appendix 4. 
 Brand trust was measured using three seven-point semantic differential scales 
(reliable/unreliable, dependable/not at all dependable, and trustworthy/not at all trustworthy; αpre 
= .952, αpost = .966) (Dawar and Pillutla 2000; Puzakova 2013). Similar as the operationalization 
on attitude, a mean trust score was computed to be used in the analysis, and trust change was also 
computed by subtracting post-crisis mean trust from the baseline mean trust
9
. Specific scales are 
listed in Appendix 5. 
 Purchase intention was used to indicate the behavioral dimension on consumer responses. 
Though criticized in previous literatures as a flawed indicator on consumer actual buying 
behavior, it has always been one of the most commonly used proxies for measuring consumer 
behaviors. In this study, purchase intention was measured using two seven-point Likert scales 
(“Next time I buy a TV, I will take (brand name) into consideration”; “I can image myself 
buying a (brand name) TV”; 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree; αpre = .958, αpost = .979) 
(Puzakova 2013). Same as the operationalization on brand attitude and trust, a mean purchase 
intention score was computed by subtracting post-crisis mean score from the baseline mean 
score
10
. Specific scales are listed in Appendix 6. 
 Cognitive responses were measured by using a thought listing task (see Appendix 8). 
That is, participants were given five minutes to list all the thoughts they had while reading the 
target newspaper article immediately after exposure to the target article (Ahluwalia et al. 2000). 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
(y) standard deviations are equal (i.e., λ=σx/σy=1) and when the correlation between the two scores is high (ρxy≈1). 
Given our data, λ = 1.16 and ρxy=0.82, the reliability of difference scores is not a serious concern for our research. 
9 Given our data, λ = 1.18 and ρxy=0.77, the reliability of difference scores is not a serious concern for our research. 
10 Given our data, λ = 1.08 and ρxy=0.81, the reliability of difference scores is not a serious concern for our research. 
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All the thoughts were then coded into three broad categories: support arguments, 
counterarguments, and other thoughts. The coding was conducted by the researcher and one 
independent judge blind to the research hypotheses. There was 87% agreement between the 
judge and researcher, and the disagreements were resolved by discussion. 
 Disconfirmation of expectation measure was adapted from Ahluwalia et al. (2002). It 
consists of three seven-point semantic differential scales (consistent/inconsistent with 
expectation, not at all worse/worse than anticipated, and not at all worse/worse than expected; α 
= .829). Specific scales are listed in Appendix 10. 
6.5. Results 
6.5.1. Manipulation Checks 
 
Brand equity was assessed with five seven-point semantic differential scales adapted 
from existing scales (Yoo and Donthu 2001; Brady et al. 2008) (brand loyalty, brand attitude, 
brand image, brand quality, and willingness to pay; α = .937). Specific items are listed in 
Appendix 3. Independent t-tests reveal that participants perceive the brand (i.e., Sony) in high-
equity condition has significantly higher brand equity than the brand in low-equity condition (i.e., 
Insignia) (MSony = 5.48, MInsignia = 2.54; p < .001). Thus, brand equity manipulation was 
successful. 
Crisis severity was manipulated using the scenarios developed in the pretest. It was 
measured using three seven-point semantic differential scales (severe/not severe, major/minor, 
significant/not significant; α = .929) (Roehm and Brady 2007). Specific scales are listed in 
Appendix 9. Independent t-tests show that subjects perceive the crisis to be more severe in the 
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high severity condition than in the low severity condition (Mhigh = 6.03 Mlow = 4.40; p < .001), 
indicating that the crisis severity manipulation was effective.  
In addition, two seven-point Likert scales were used to check whether participants 
perceive the negative news as more strongly related to performance-related or value-related crisis. 
A paired-samples t-test reveal that subjects rated the crisis as more strongly related to product 
performance than general firm conducts (Mperformance = 5.90, Mvalue = 2.85; p < .001). Same as in 
the pretest, participants were also asked to classify the news article as either performance-related 
or value-related crisis. All participants except four correctly identified the news article as talking 
about performance-related crisis. This suggests that the crisis was perceived as performance-
related as we intended. The four participants who failed to recognize the target news as 
performance-related crisis were dropped out from further analysis. In addition, one sample t-tests 
show that participants did perceive all the crisis articles as providing negative information 
(Mcondition1 = 5.95; t(28)differ from 4 = 9.94, p < .001; Mcondition2 = 5.57; t(33)differ from 4 = 7.94, p 
< .001; Mcondition3 = 5.96; t(33)differ from 4 = 11.05, p < .001; Mcondition4 = 6.10; t(35)differ from 4 = 
11.64, p < .001;), proving the validity of our crisis scenarios. Also, participants’ involvement and 
perceived believability towards the news article do not statistically differ across the four 
conditions (ps > .10). Finally, the articles are of similar length across conditions and participants 
indicated that they were relatively unfamiliar with the news article they read in the study. 
Specific scales are listed in the Appendix 11, 12 and 13. 
6.5.2. Hypothesis Tests 
 
 Our hypothesis that brand equity would buffer consumer negative responses in low 
severity crisis condition but amplify them in high severity crisis condition implies that there 
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should be an interaction effect between crisis severity and brand equity on consumer negative 
responses (i.e., brand attitude, trust, and purchase intention change). To test our prediction, we 
perform a MANOVA on attitude change, trust change, and purchase intention change. Brand 
equity and crisis severity are independent variables. Since brand familiarity and brand 
commitment were identified in previous literature as key moderators influencing consumer 
negative responses in a brand crisis context (Ahluwalia et al. 2000; Cleeren et al. 2008), they are 
included as covariates in the MANOVA. The Bartlett’s test of sphericity show a significant 
result (Chi-square = 152.48, df = 5, p < .001), indicating that the correlations among the three 
dependent variables are strong enough for a MANOVA. As expected, a multivariate interaction 
effect between brand equity and crisis severity is observed (λ = .89, F (3, 125) = 5.32, p < .01). 
Since the multivariate main effect of brand commitment (λ = .99, F (3, 125) = .28, p > .99) and 
brand familiarity (λ = .99, F (3, 125) = .04, p > .83) are not significant, they are dropped out in 
the following analysis.  
The individual ANOVAs verify that the interaction effect between brand equity and crisis 
severity manifest on all three dependent variables (attitude change: F (1, 129) = 12.08, p < .01; 
trust change: F (1, 129) = 7.05, p < .01; purchase intention change: F (1, 129) = 13.96, p < .001). 
To further explore the interactions, simple effect analyses were performed at each level of crisis 
severity. Contrary to H1a, simple effect tests show that brand equity does not attenuate the 
dependent variables in a low severity crisis condition (λ = .95, F (3, 59) = 1.13, p > .34). The 
results suggest that in a low severity performance-related crisis, brand equity has no significant 
main effect on consumer negative responses. In another word, whether the involved brand has 
low or high brand equity, consumers would change their brand attitude, brand trust, and brand 
purchase intention to the same extent in a low severity condition. Therefore, the hypothesized 
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buffering effect from H1a is not supported. H1b proposed that in a high severity condition, brand 
equity will become a liability, amplifying consumer negative responses. This proposition is 
supported. In a high severity performance-related crisis, a significant multivariate main effect of 
brand equity is observed (λ = .78, F (3, 66) = 6.06, p <.01). Individual ANOVAs show that 
consumers downgrade their brand attitude (Mhigh = 2.12, Mlow = 1.19; F (1, 68) = 16.19, p <.001), 
brand trust (Mhigh = 2.41, Mlow = 1.44; F (1, 68) = 12.98, p <.001), and brand purchase intention 
(Mhigh = 1.92, Mlow = .87; F (1, 68) = 12.78, p <.001) to a greater extent for a high equity brand 
compared with a low equity brand in a high severity condition. Therefore, H1b is supported. In 
conclusion, H1 is partially supported. Although no buffering effect from brand equity is 
identified in a low severity condition, the interaction effect between brand equity and crisis 
severity is supported. In particular, we find that brand equity will intensify consumer negative 
responses in a performance-related crisis but only when the crisis is of high severity. 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Insert Figure 1 – 3, Table 3 – 4 about Here 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
6.5.3. Process Tests 
 
We hypothesized that brand equity would have an attenuating effect on consumer 
negative responses in a low crisis severity condition, and we reasoned that consumers tend to 
engage in a defensive mode to discount the negative information. We anticipated that the 
counterarguments generated towards the negative news would account for the hypothesized 
buffering effect. Although such a buffering effect is not supported in our study, we do find that 
in a low severity condition, counterarguments are more prevalent for high equity brand than low 
equity brand (Mhigh = 2.97, Mlow = .59; t = -7.22, p < .001). This preliminary result suggests that 
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the proposed mechanism may work. That is, consumers indeed engage in biased processing in a 
low severity condition, but for some unaccounted reasons, this defensive mechanism does not 
produce a significant main effect of brand equity (i.e., buffering effect). Therefore, we conducted 
the proposed mediation analysis for the low severity condition even there was no observed main 
effect from brand equity on consumer responses change
11
. To test whether brand equity has an 
effect on consumer responses change through consumers’ biased information processing, we 
included the number of counterarguments as a mediator of the effect of brand equity on brand 
attitude, trust, and purchase intention change separately. Following Zhao et al. (2010), we tested 
the mediation by using the bias corrected bootstrap test of the indirect effect. We repeated the 
mediation analysis for all three dependent variables: attitude change, trust change, and purchase 
intention change. As expected, the results show that counterarguments significantly mediate 
brand equity’s effect on all three dependent variables. Using 5,000 bootstrap samples, the bias 
corrected 95% confidence intervals for the indirect effect through counterarguments do not 
include zero for all three dependent variables, suggesting that the estimates of the indirect effect 
from brand equity to consumer evaluations change through counterarguments are significant at p 
< .05 (attitude change: ab = -1.0395, 95% CI = [-1.3647; -.7588]; trust change: ab = -1.1253, 95% 
CI = [-1.5592; -.7602]; purchase intention change: ab = -.6415, 95% CI = [-1.1566; -.1958]). 
Therefore, though implicitly, brand equity does buffer against consumer negative responses in a 
low severity condition through number of counterarguments, supporting H2a. 
As for the high severity condition, we observed an amplifying effect from brand equity 
on consumer negative responses, and we reasoned that consumers tend to be especially 
                                                            
11 Although Baron and Kenny (1986) proposed that one of the premises of mediation effect is a zero-order effect of 
the independent variable on the dependent variable, it has been criticized recently by Zhao et al. (2010). Zhao et al. 
(2010) proposed that in a competitive mediation, the direct effect and indirect (i.e., mediation) effect both exist but 
work in opposite directions, resulting in no total effect (i.e., zero-order effect). 
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disappointed when a strong brand is involved in a severe crisis. Thus, we anticipated to see such 
negative disconfirmation of expectation to mediate the differences in consumer response change 
between high- and low-equity brands. We repeated mediation analyses by including 
disconfirmation of expectation as the mediator for the high severity condition. As expected, 
disconfirmation of expectation does emerge as a significant mediator for brand equity’s 
amplifying effect. Following the same procedure, we used 5,000 bootstrap samples and found 
that the bias corrected 95% confidence intervals for the indirect effect through disconfirmation of 
expectation do not include zero for all three dependent variables, suggesting that the estimates of 
the indirect effect from brand equity to consumer evaluations change through disconfirmation of 
expectation are significant at p < .05 (attitude change: ab = .5955, 95% CI = [.3487; .9810]; trust 
change: ab = .7496, 95% CI = [.4175; 1.2236]; purchase intention change: ab = .6185, 95% CI = 
[.2831; 1.0882]). Thus, consumers’ disconfirmation of expectation accounts for brand equity’s 
amplifying effect on consumer negative responses in a high severity condition, supporting H2b. 
6.6. Discussion of Experiment 1  
 
The purpose of Experiment 1 is to investigate the role of brand equity in a performance-
related crisis. In particular, we examine how brand equity interacts with crisis severity in 
influencing consumer negative responses. The findings partially support H1.  As hypothesized, a 
significant interaction effect between brand equity and crisis severity is observed. This is in 
accordance with the contingency view we discussed before. That is, the role of brand equity in a 
performance-related crisis is contingent on the severity level of a brand crisis. Supporting our 
hypothesis, we find that brand equity can become a liability in a highly severe performance-
related crisis, exacerbating consumer negative responses, both attitudinally and behaviorally. 
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However, a buffering effect does not emerge in a moderately severe crisis as expected. The 
results indicate that in a low severity condition, consumers downgrade their evaluations towards 
an erring brand to the same extent regardless of a priori brand equity. This finding is in contrary 
to some previous studies where a good brand was advocated to provide some reservoir of 
goodwill amid negative publicity, possibly because though conceptually related with brand 
commitment or brand familiarity, brand equity reflects multiple facets of consumer knowledge 
(Keller, 1993)., and thus it may work in a different way from those related constructs in a brand 
crisis context (Ahluwalia et al. 2000; Dawar and Pillutla; Cleeren et al. 2008). This also suggests 
that we should not generalize one attitude dimension to another without caution (Petty and 
Krosnick 1995). Overall, Experiment 1 identified crisis severity as an important contingent 
condition in brand equity’s effect on consumer negative responses. Specifically, brand equity 
will intensify consumers’ backlash in a performance-related crisis but only when the crisis is of 
high severity level.  
Furthermore, current study also seeks to investigate the underlying mechanisms for brand 
equity’s effect in a performance-related crisis from a consumer-based perspective. Results from 
mediation analyses support H2. As expected, in a low severity condition, consumers tend to 
engage in biased processing, defending a high-equity brand from the negative information. 
Compared with a low-equity brand, consumers have more counterarguments against the crisis 
information for a high-equity brand. Although no main effect (i.e., buffering effect) was 
observed from brand equity on consumer responses in a low severity condition, the number of 
counterarguments still emerged as a significant mediator accounting for brand equity’s effect on 
consumer evaluations change. The significant indirect effect through counterarguments implies 
that brand equity can provide some protection against consumer negative responses in a low 
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severity condition, but only implicitly. The opposite signs of the direct and indirect effect from 
the mediation analyses indicate a competitive mediation
12
. Therefore, there might be some other 
mechanisms causing brand equity to augment consumer negative responses which overshadowed 
the “counterarguments” mechanism. That is, an amplifying direct effect may work against the 
buffering indirect effect through counterarguments, resulting in a misleading no effect 
observation. As we reasoned in the high severity condition, one plausible explanation for the 
opposite direct effect is disconfirmation of expectation, that is, consumers may expect more from 
a good brand and this high expectation traps a strong brand in a crisis context. A follow-up 
mediation analysis using disconfirmation of expectation as the mediator was performed. 
Disconfirmation of expectation does not emerge as a significant mediator as expected in a low 
severity condition. The bias corrected 95% confidence intervals for the indirect effect through 
disconfirmation of expectation include zero for all three dependent variables (attitude change: ab 
= -.0169, 95% CI = [-.1801; .1185]; trust change: ab = -.0196, 95% CI = [-.2109; .0791]; 
purchase intention change: ab = -.0270, 95% CI = [-.2677; .1814]). Another possible explanation 
for the opposite direct effect is that in a crisis context, the negative information creates a ceiling 
effect on the low equity brand. In other words, because consumers have low expectation about a 
low end brand, a low-equity brand may have little to lose in a crisis context, obscuring a high-
equity brand’s buffering effect. Though which mechanisms work in the opposite way warrants 
further analysis, our mediation analysis using counterarguments in a low severity condition still 
provide valuable insights about the phenomenon under investigation.  
On the other hand, in a high severity condition, we hypothesized that the extremely 
negative information from a performance-related crisis becomes too diagnostic for consumers to 
                                                            
12 In a competitive mediation, the direct effect and indirect (i.e., mediation) effect both exist and but work in 
opposite directions, sometimes resulting in no discernable total effect (i.e., zero-order effect) (Zhao et al. 2010). 
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dismiss. In this situation, brand equity becomes a liability because consumers feel intensified 
disappointment when a high-equity brand is involved in a severe crisis. Our findings demonstrate 
that disconfirmation of expectation significantly mediates the amplifying effect from brand 
equity, supporting our theorizing.  
In summary, Experiment 1 provides some empirical support for both H1 and H2. 
However, our first study is constrained by its scope. That is, only performance-related crises are 
investigated in this experiment. How does brand equity works in a value-related crisis still 
remains to be known in the literature. Previous literature on brand negative publicity almost 
exclusively focuses on performance-related crisis due to its preponderance (Dawar and Pillutla 
2000). With the increasingly sensitive public reactions to ethical issues and firms’ enthusiasm on 
CSR initiatives, there is a call for more research on firm unethical conducts (Folkes and Kamins 
1999). We adopted a contingency view in examining brand equity’s effect in a crisis context and 
we propose that crisis type may serve as another key contingency variable. That is, the role of 
brand equity in influencing consumer negative responses may differ in value-related crisis as 
compared with performance-related crisis. Therefore, we conducted a second study to 
specifically examine brand equity’s effect in value-related crises.  
7. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Although the increasingly frequent brand crises have drawn extensive academic attention, 
previous studies almost exclusively attended to performance-related crises due to its 
preponderance (e.g., Ahluwalia et al. 2000; Dawar and Pillutla 2000; Cleeren et al. 2008; Chen et 
al. 2009; Darke et al. 2010). The scarcity of literature on value-related crises calls into the 
question that whether consumer respond to these two different types of crisis contexts in the 
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same manner. The limited extant literatures on value-related crisis as well as the findings from 
our focus group study shed some light  that consumers may react differently in a value-related 
crisis, that is, buffering effect may not be evident in a value-related crisis (e.g., Cooksey and 
Kuchina-Musina 2010; Trump 2014). Trump (2014) found that the buffering effect from 
connected consumers no longer exist in a firm ethical transgression even when the misdeed is not 
personal relevant. This is in line with our focus group study findings that participants tend to 
perceive firm unethical conducts as especially diagnostic and are less likely to counterargue 
against such negative information, even when they expressed that the crisis was not considered 
as relevant or severe.  
Therefore, we suggest that brand equity should not provide a reservoir of goodwill in a 
value-related crisis regardless of crisis severity. In addition, consistent with our discussion on a 
severe performance-related crisis, we propose that brand equity becomes a liability in a value-
related crisis due to the heightened negative disconfirmation of expectation effect. This dark side 
of a good brand has been documented by literatures on philanthropy. For example, Dean (2003) 
investigated how consumers perceive different types of charitable donations made by companies 
with varying levels of reputation, and he found that the effect of conditional donation (i.e., the 
donation is tied with revenue-generating transactions) on corporate image is negatively 
associated with company reputation, such that a conditional donation would increase the image 
of an irresponsible firm but a scrupulous firm suffered a loss of image. Some anecdotal evidence 
has also supported such an amplifying perspective. For example, after the 2008 Wenchuan 
earthquake in China, many large corporates (e.g., Dell and Wanke) confronted strong criticism 
from the public due to their “small” charitable donations. The general public intuitively considers 
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these large firms as affluent and expects them to take more responsibilities, and this high 
expectation becomes a liability in a value-related crisis. 
We draw from literatures on interpersonal relationships to explain why consumers 
respond differently in different crisis contexts. That is, unlike in a performance-related crisis, 
consumers tend to perceive even a low severity value-related transgression as highly diagnostic. 
Literatures on interpersonal trust revealed that people react differently towards competence 
versus integrity based trust violations because there may be some inherence differences in the 
way people make dispositional attributions about competence versus integrity (Kim et al. 2004; 
2006, Reeder and Brewer 1979).
13
 For example, it has been demonstrated that people tend to 
perceive negative information as more diagnostic and weigh negative information more heavily 
than positive information in the domain of integrity, yet they tend to assign more weight to 
positive rather than negative information in the domain of competence (Kim et al. 2004, Martijn 
et al. 1992). Kim et al. (2004) investigated competence versus integrity based trust transgression 
in interpersonal relationship using a schematic model of dispositional attribution. Based on this 
model, people may intuitively believe that those with high competence can performance at 
various competence levels depending on their motivations and other external factors. For 
example, even a great baseball player may have a bad day and strike out. Therefore, a single 
failure is often discounted as a reliable signal of incompetence because both competent and 
incompetent person can have poor performance under certain situations. However, when it 
comes to integrity-based transgression, people seem to have a very different mechanism to assess 
the situation. They intuitively believe that those with high integrity would not engage in any 
dishonest behavior regardless of external situations and only those with low integrity will act 
                                                            
13 Competence-based trust is defined as the trustor’s perception that the trustee is equipped with required technical 
and interpersonal skills to fulfill a task (Butler and Cantrell 1984). Integrity-based trust is defined as the trustor’s 
perception that the trustee will adhere to an acceptable ethical standards (Mayer et al. 1995). 
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dishonestly. Thus, one single integrity-based wrongdoing can be perceived as a reliable signal 
for low-integrity, just as the old proverb “once a thief, always a thief” indicates (Reeder and 
Brewer 1979). In their study, Kim et al. (2004) showed that people find integrity-based 
transgression harder to forgive than competence-based ones, and using denial is a better recovery 
strategy than apology for integrity based violations.  
Based on this logic, we suggest that the same schematic model of dispositional attribution 
in interpersonal relationship literature should also apply to consumer-brand relationship. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that similar differential responses will be observed in a competence-
based transgression (i.e. performance-related crisis) versus integrity-based transgression (i.e., 
value-related crisis). That is, although consumers may perceive a performance-related crisis as an 
anomaly and discount its diagnosticity in a low severity situation, it’s unlikely that they will 
discount the impact from value-related crisis regardless of crisis severity levels, given that 
consumers may intuitively believe one single unethical conduct is diagnostic enough to indicate 
that a company has low ethical standard. Thus, we put forward the hypotheses as follows: 
 
H3: Brand equity will amplify negative consumer responses in a value-related crisis, 
regardless of crisis severity. 
 
H4: The amplifying effect is likely to be mediated by disconfirmation of expectation 
of consumers in a value related crisis. 
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8. EXPERIMENT 2 
 
Experiment 2 was conducted to test H3 and H4. In particular, we aim to investigate the 
role of brand equity on consumers’ responses in a value-related crisis context. Unlike in a 
performance-related crisis where crisis severity served as a moderator, we expect that brand 
equity would augment consumer negative responses in a value-related crisis, regardless of crisis 
severity. Process explanations are also examined in this experiment. In this study, the design, 
procedure, and measures are almost identical as in Experiment 1, except that we replace 
performance-related crises with value-related crises in the target newspaper articles. 
8.1.Participants and Design 
 
 One hundred and twenty seven participants from a Canadian university participated in 
Experiment 2 for extra course credit. Subjects were recruited through an online research 
participation system and flyers posted on campus. Their mean age was 21.78 years with a range 
from 18 to 31 years. Gender was almost evenly split at 45% males and 55% females, respectively. 
The predominant ethnic origin was Caucasians at 63 percent, followed by Asians, South Asians, 
and African Americans. These demographic variables were also checked across different 
experiment conditions and no significant differences were identified. Same as in Experiment 1, a 
2 (brand equity: high versus low) × 2 (crisis severity: extremely severe versus moderately severe) 
between-subjects design was used. Same television brands were also chosen to serve as high and 
low brand equity conditions (i.e., Sony and Insignia). The only exception was that different 
stimuli scenarios (i.e., value-related crisis) were used in Experiment 2. The new manipulation 
articles were developed based on another pretest. 
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8.2.Stimuli Development and Pretest 
 
 Moderately and highly severe value-related crisis articles were developed through 
another pretest. Though a poor labor practice scenario was used in our focus group studies, the 
discussion suggested that participants perceived labor practice problem as ubiquitous and less of 
a valid brand crisis context. Thus, this scenario was abandoned and we designed a racial 
discrimination scenario to serve as the target crisis. 25 participants (Mage = 21.24, 60% female) 
participated in the pretest for extra course credit. They were asked to read a recent newspaper 
article on the Global and Mail regarding a racial discrimination problem with Sony. Either a high 
severity or low severity article was randomly assigned to respondents. In the high severity 
condition, the article depicted a scene where employers use racial slurs and derogatory 
metaphors to insult African-American employees and a law suit had been filed in the court. In 
the low severity condition, African-American employees faced more strict requirements to get 
promoted and an investigation was filed by Fair Labor Association (see Appendix 16 and 17). 
After reading the target article, participants were asked to fill out a short questionnaire assessing 
their attitude towards the target news article including crisis severity, whether they perceive the 
article as more related to product performance or ethical conduct, their familiarity with, attention 
paid to, and believability of the newspaper article (see Appendix 11, 12 and 13). An independent 
sample t-test show that severity is rated considerably higher in high severity condition than in 
low severity condition as intended (Mhigh = 5.75, Mlow = 4.33; p < .01). Also, all subjects 
identified the target article as related to firm conduct rather than product performance. In terms 
of the negativity about the news message, participants were asked to indicate to what extent they 
perceive the news article as negative towards the brand described in the article (1 = Not At All 
Negative, 7 = Very Negative). The ratings were significantly higher than the theoretical midpoint 
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4 for both conditions (Mhigh = 6.17; t(12)diff from 4 = 8.99, p < .001; Mlow = 6.19; t(13)diff from 4 = 
8.76, p < .001) but does not differ in terms of extremity across the two severity conditions (Mhigh 
= 6.17, Mlow = 6.19; p > .94), indicating that the target articles were successfully manipulated as 
negative information. Moreover, the articles in both conditions were also rated as equivalent in 
familiarity (Mhigh = 1.08, Mlow = 1.00; p > .30), believability (Mhigh =5.67, Mlow = 5.31; p > .45), 
and participants’ involvement (Mhigh = 5.04, Mlow = 4.92; p > .82).  
8.3. Experimental Procedure and Measures 
 
 The specific procedures were exactly the same as in Experiment 1. Subjects were 
randomly assigned to one of the four experiment conditions and they were run in small groups. 
The only exception was that participants read a different stimuli article in each condition (i.e., 
value-related crisis scenario). Same measures were used to collect dependent variables and 
manipulation variables. Based on a suspicion probe, none of the participants guessed the purpose 
of the study. 
8.4. Results 
8.4.1. Manipulation Checks 
 
Independent t-tests reveal that participants perceive the brand (i.e., Sony) in high-equity 
condition has significantly higher brand equity than the brand in low-equity condition (i.e., 
Insignia) (MSony = 5.49, MInsignia = 2.71; p < .001), indicating that brand equity manipulation is 
successful. Crisis severity was manipulated using the scenarios developed in the pretest. 
Independent t-tests show that subjects perceive the crisis to be more severe in the high severity 
64 
 
condition than in the low severity condition (Mhigh = 5. 84, Mlow = 4.54; p < .001), suggesting 
that the crisis severity manipulation is also effective. In addition, a paired-samples t-test reveal 
that subjects rate the crisis as more strongly related to firm general conduct than product 
performance (Mperformance = 1.89, Mvalue = 6.25; p < .001). In addition, participants were also 
asked to classify the news article as either a performance-related or value-related crisis. All 
participants correctly identified the news article as talking about value-related crisis. This 
suggests that the crisis was perceived as value-related as intended. In addition, one sample t-tests 
show that participants do perceive all the crisis articles as providing negative information 
(Mcondition1 = 6.36; t(32)differ from 4 = 18.55, p < .001; Mcondition2 = 6.23; t(30)differ from 4 = 14.42, p 
< .001; Mcondition3 = 5.94; t(33)differ from 4 = 11.34, p < .001; Mcondition4 = 6.22; t(30)differ from 4 = 
14.84, p < .001). Also, participants’ involvement and news article believability do not 
statistically differ across the four conditions (ps > .10). Finally, the articles are of similar length 
across conditions and participants indicated that they were unfamiliar with the news article they 
read in the study. 
8.4.2. Hypothesis Tests 
 
 Our hypothesis that brand equity would amplify negative consumer responses in a value-
related crisis regardless of crisis severity indicates the absence of an interaction effect between 
crisis severity and brand equity on consumer negative responses (i.e., brand attitude, trust, and 
purchase intention change). To test our prediction, we perform a MANOVA on attitude change, 
trust change, and purchase intention change. Brand equity and crisis severity are independent 
variables. Similar as in the first study, we include brand familiarity and brand commitment as 
covariates in the MANOVA because they were identified in previous literature as key 
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moderators influencing consumer negative responses in a brand crisis context (Ahluwalia et al. 
2000; Cleeren et al. 2008). They were dropped out in further analyses because the multivariate 
main effect of brand commitment (λ = .97, F (3, 119) = 1.24, p > .30) and brand familiarity (λ 
= .96, F (3, 119) = 1.55, p > .20) are not significant. The Bartlett’s test of sphericity show a 
significant result (Chi-square = 134.87, df = 5, p < .001), indicating that the correlations among 
the three dependent variables are strong enough to perform MANOVA.  
 As expected, unlike in performance-related crisis, the multivariate interaction effect 
between brand equity and crisis severity is not significant (λ > .99, F (3, 121) = .08, p > .97). 
This is consistent with H3 in that crisis severity no longer moderates brand equity’s effect on 
consumer negative responses in a value-related crisis. A significant multivariate main effect of 
brand equity (i.e., amplifying effect) is observed (λ = .73, F (3, 121) = 14.86, p < .001). The 
individual ANOVAs show that consumers change their brand attitude (Mhigh = 2.17, Mlow = .91; 
F (1, 123) = 39.68, p <.001), brand trust (Mhigh = 1.71, Mlow = .99; F (1, 123) = 10.20, p <.01), 
and brand purchase intention (Mhigh = 1.39, Mlow = .85; F (1, 123) = 4.20, p <.05) to a greater 
extent for a high equity brand compared with a low equity brand in a value-related crisis, 
supporting H3. This suggests that brand equity amplifies consumer negative responses in a 
value-related crisis. Therefore, H3 is fully supported. 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Insert Figure 4 – 6, Table 5 – 6 about Here 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
8.4.3. Process Tests 
 
Mediation analyses were performed to test H4 regarding the underlying mechanism for 
the observed amplifying effect from brand equity in a value-related crisis. Specifically, we argue 
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that consumers tend to perceive a value-related crisis as highly diagnostic regardless of crisis 
severity and may fail to defend a high-equity brand against the negative information. Thus, they 
may become especially disappointed when a strong brand is involved in any value-related crisis. 
Therefore, we anticipate that the negative disconfirmation of expectation to mediate the 
differences in consumer response change between high- and low-equity brands across crisis 
severity conditions. Though the interaction effect between brand equity and crisis severity was 
not significant in value-related crises, we also perform the mediation analyses separately for the 
low and high severity conditions because it is possible that the observed amplifying effect from 
brand equity may work through different mechanisms in low versus high severity conditions, just 
like in Experiment 1 in performance-related crises. 
To test whether brand equity has an effect on consumer responses change through 
disconfirmation of expectation, we included the disconfirmation of expectation as a mediator of 
the effect of brand equity on brand attitude, trust, and purchase intention change separately. 
Following Zhao et al. (2010), we tested the mediation by using the bias corrected bootstrap test 
of the indirect effect. We repeated the mediation analyses for all three dependent variables: 
attitude change, trust change, and purchase intention change. As expected, the results show that 
disconfirmation of expectation significantly mediates brand equity’s effect on all three dependent 
variables across severity conditions. Using 5,000 bootstrap samples, the bias corrected 95% 
confidence intervals for the indirect effect through disconfirmation of expectation do not include 
zero for all three dependent variables, suggesting that the estimates of the indirect effect from 
brand equity to consumer evaluations change through disconfirmation of expectation are 
significant at p < .05 across severity conditions (attitude change: ab = .7056, 95% CI = [.4049; 
1.0569]; trust change: ab = .4612, 95% CI = [.1404; .8673]; purchase intention change: ab 
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= .5805, 95% CI = [.2256; 1.0253]). Then following the same procedure, we repeated mediation 
analyses by including disconfirmation of expectation as the mediator for the low and high 
severity conditions separately. In the low crisis severity condition, we find the same result that 
disconfirmation of expectation significantly mediates brand equity’s effect on all three dependent 
variables (attitude change: ab = .4774, 95% CI = [.1878; .9805]; trust change: ab = .3551, 95% 
CI = [.0388; .8258]; purchase intention change: ab = .4481, 95% CI = [.1229; .9270]). The same 
result is also observed in high severity condition where the bias corrected 95% confidence 
intervals for the indirect effect through disconfirmation of expectation also do not include zero 
for all three dependent variables, indicating that the estimates of the indirect effect from brand 
equity to consumer evaluations change through disconfirmation of expectation are significant at 
p < .05 (attitude change: ab = 1.0037, 95% CI = [.5093; 1.6468]; trust change: ab = .6626, 95% 
CI = [.0188; 1.3513]; purchase intention change: ab = .7924, 95% CI = [.1015; 1.6546]). 
Therefore, H4 is fully supported, that is, we demonstrate that consumers’ disconfirmation of 
expectation accounts for brand equity’s amplifying effect on consumer negative responses in a 
value-related crisis regardless of crisis severity. 
8.5. Discussion of Experiment 2 
 
The purpose of Experiment 2 is to investigate the role of brand equity in a value-related 
crisis. The findings fully support H3.  As hypothesized, there was no significant interaction effect 
between brand equity and crisis severity. Unlike in performance-related crises, the role of brand 
equity in a value-related crisis is not contingent on the severity level of a crisis. Supporting the 
hypothesis, we find that brand equity has a significant multivariate main effect on consumer 
negative responses. More specifically, brand equity becomes a liability in any value-related crisis 
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regardless of crisis severity. When a value-related crisis happens to a good brand, the backlash 
from consumers exacerbates both attitudinally and behaviorally. Furthermore, we also seek to 
investigate the underlying mechanisms for brand equity’s amplifying effect in a value-related 
crisis from a consumer-based perspective. Results from mediation analyses fully support H4. As 
expected, consumers tend to perceive value-related transgressions as highly diagnostic and 
difficult to counterargue. In this situation, regardless of crisis severity, brand equity becomes a 
liability because consumers feel especially disappointed when a reputable brand is involved in a 
value-related misconduct. The findings demonstrate that disconfirmation of expectation 
significantly mediates the amplifying effect from brand equity in both severity conditions. 
In summary, Experiment 2 provides some strong support for both H3 and H4, extending 
our understanding on the role of brand equity from performance-related crises into value-related 
crises. The results reveal that brand equity may have different effects on consumer negative 
responses through different mechanisms in a value-related crisis compared with in a 
performance-related crisis. This finding indicates that crisis type (i.e., performance- versus 
value-related crisis) is another important contingent condition impacting brand equity’s effect in 
a brand crisis context.  
9. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Brand crises occur even more frequently in today’s marketplace, and they can seriously 
damange the valuable yet fragial brand equity (Dawar and Pillutla 2000). An important question 
to ask is – does the marketing investment made earlier in building a strong brand pay off in a 
non-routine crisis context? The objective of this research is to address this question by examining 
the role of brand equity in various brand crisis contexts. Traditional wisdom suggests that 
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building a strong brand can provide a reservoir of goodwill to protect the brand from its own 
wrongdoings, yet through a focus group and two experiment studies, our findings have indicated 
otherwise, dragging down brand equity from the shrine (Brady et al. 2008; Ahluwalia et al. 2000; 
Ahluwalia 2002; Cleeren et al. 2008; Pullig et al. 2006; Dawar and Pillutla 2000). 
Specifically, based on our focus group studies, we find that brand equity may buffer a 
brand against consumer negative responses in a brand crisis, but this buffering effect is very 
limited. The results suggest that crisis severity and crisis type may serve as important 
contingency variables to direct brand equity’s effect on consumer negative responses. Thus, 
whether a positive “halo effect” or a negative “love becomes hate effect” will emerge cannot be 
easily predicted without consideration of the severity level and the domain of a brand crisis.  
The findings from the focus group study were further tested quantitatively through two 
laboratory experiments. Experiment 1 investigates brand equity’s effect in performance-related 
crises. The results indicate that brand equity will intensify consumer negative responses but only 
when the crisis is of high severity level. When the severity of a crisis attenuates, the amplifying 
effect disappears. To explore the psychological mechanisms underlying brand equity’s 
differential effect, mediation analyses were performed. Counterarguments generated against the 
negative information are identified to account for the absence of amplifying effect in a low 
severity condition, whereas disconfirmation of expectation is found to explain the observed 
amplifying effect in the high severity condition. Although a hypothesized buffering effect is not 
observed in a low severity performance-related crisis in Experiment 1, the significant mediating 
effect of counterarguments indicates that brand equity does provide somewhat buffering effect 
through the path of counterarguments. This suggests that the absence of brand equity’s main 
effect (i.e., expected buffering effect) may be due to the overlook of other coexisting 
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mechanisms that work against the buffering effect from counterarguments. One possible 
explanation is that the negative force offsetting counterarguments’ buffering effect originates 
from a ceiling effect from the low equity brand. That is, because consumers have low 
expectation about a low-equity brand, such a brand may have little to lose in a brand crisis 
context, obscuring a high-equity brand’s buffering effect. Though which other mechanisms work 
in the opposite way to offset brand equity’s buffering effect warrants further research, our 
mediation analysis using counterarguments in a low severity condition still provide valuable 
insights about the phenomenon under investigation.  
Experiment 2 extends Experiment 1 by looking into the role of brand equity in value-
related crises. The results show that brand equity largely amplifies consumer negative responses 
in value-related crises regardless of crisis severity. Disconfirmation of expectation has been 
demonstrated to mediate the observed amplifying effect in both severity conditions. Therefore, 
the results from the two experimental studies support our theoretical framework, showing that 
crisis severity moderates brand equity’s effect in a brand crisis and this moderating role of crisis 
severity is further determined by crisis type (i.e., performance- versus value-related crisis). 
9.1. Theoretical Implications 
 
First, this research adds to the extant brand crises literature by examining the role of 
brand equity in influencing consumer negative responses in various crisis contexts. This is one of 
the few studies that specifically looked into the role of brand equity in affecting consumer 
responses to brand harm crisis. Though various consumer-, firm-, and/or crisis-related factors 
have been investigated in previous literature on negative publicity, limited research has 
specifically examined the role of brand equity in a brand crisis context (Ahluwalia et al. 2000; 
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Cleeren et al. 2008; Dawar and Pillutla 2000; Rea et al. 2014; Siomkos and Kurzbard 1994). 
Extant brand crisis literature often vaguely defined brand equity and used other constructs such 
as firm reputation as proxies for brand equity (Siomkos and Kurzbard 1994). Our research 
advances understanding in the brand crisis literature by distinguishing brand equity from other 
related constructs. Contrary to the mainstream literature on negative publicity that advocates a 
halo effect, our research findings uphold the contingency view with regard to the impact of brand 
equity. This indicates that though sharing substantial similarity, brand equity still work in very 
different ways from some similar constructs like brand reputation and commitment. 
 Second, our study advances the literature on negative publicity by demonstrating the 
effectiveness of the usage of contingency view in a complex situation such as in a brand crisis. 
This thesis addresses both buffering and amplifying theoretical perspective with regard to the 
impact of brand equity by understanding important contingent conditions in this context. 
Specifically, we found brand equity can have very complex effects on consumer responses to 
brand crises depending on the specific contextual factors such as crisis severity and crisis type. 
Previous literature on negative brand publicity has shed some insight into a buffering or an 
amplifying effect (e.g., Dawar and Pillutla 2000; Ahluwalia et al., 2000; Cleeren et al. 2008). 
Our findings suggest that a crisis phenomenon is intrinsically complex and a signaling role of 
brand equity might be better understood by adopting a contingency perspective in this stream of 
research (Dawar 1998). 
 Third, in turn, we developed a contingency-based theoretical framework by including 
crisis severity and crisis type as key contingency variables to examine brand equity’s effect on 
consumer negative responses in a brand crisis context. To the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first research that tapped into the moderating role of crisis severity and crisis type simultaneously 
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in a brand crisis context. Specifically, we identified that crisis severity will moderate brand 
equity’s effect in a crisis context, and such moderating role of crisis severity is further 
determined by another contingency variable, crisis type. In addition, given a scarcity of literature 
on value-related crisis, this thesis also helps to enhance understanding on consumers’ experience 
and responses on firm unethical conducts. 
 Finally, our research also enriches the understanding on consumers’ processing of 
negative publicity information by delineating the psychological mechanisms underlying the 
effect of brand equity on consumer responses. Though previous researches have shed some lights 
on the underling mechanisms for both buffering and amplifying effects from certain 
psychological rent, building on extant literature, we found that multiple psychological 
mechanisms can coexist and the activation of certain mechanism is contingent on crisis severity 
and crisis type (Ahluwalia et al. 2000; Dawar and Pillutla 2000). Specifically, the results from 
our research suggest that in a moderately severe performance-related crisis, brand equity has no 
observed effect on consumer responses but counterarguments provide a significant buffering 
effect through mediation. This competitive mediation effect of counterarguments implies that a 
no effect phenomenon may be more complex than it appears. That is, multiple mechanisms may 
coexist and work against each other, obscuring the explicit effect. To our best knowledge, this 
thesis is one of the few studies that document such a competitive mediation effect in a brand 
crisis context and we contend that this phenomenon can provide a productive avenue for future 
research. 
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9.2. Managerial Implications 
 
 We started our research with one important managerial question in mind: Is building a 
strong brand an effective strategy in insulating the crisis-associated brands from consumer 
negative responses? In the end, our findings indicate that this question cannot be easily answered 
without specifying some important parameters such as crisis severity and crisis type. Specifically, 
our findings showed that consumer negative responses were exacerbated when a high-equity 
brand is involved in a crisis unless the crisis is related to product performance and is of low 
severity. Note that we do not suggest marketers to avoid building a strong brand just to avoid the 
amplifying effect in a brand crisis context. Our findings simply warn marketers to avoid the 
mental stereotype that they can rely on the reservoir of goodwill from a strong brand name to 
easily weather through a crisis (Hoeffler and Keller 2002).  
Our research documents a dark side of brand equity in a value-related crisis or when a 
performance-related crisis is of high severity. Thus, managers from highly reputable firms should 
be cautious when their firms get involved in any kind of value-related crises or a severe 
performance-related crisis. In such situations, they may become the victims of their own good 
reputations. This “love becomes hate effect” has been well-documented in service encounter 
literature and is consistent with the logic of gaps model of service quality (Grégoire and Fisher 
2008; Parasuraman et al. 1985). In addition, managers should be especially careful not to fall for 
the common sense of error that value-related crisis has no impact on consumer s’ evaluation on 
products per se. Though corporate social responsibility may not have a direct impact on 
consumer product evaluations, Brown and Dacin (1997) identified that corporate social 
responsibility exerts an indirect effect on product evaluations through its direct impact on overall 
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corporate evaluations. Based on our findings, value-related crises may be the worst nightmare for 
a well-known company and managers should be wary in addressing this type of brand crisis. 
Furthermore, an understanding of consumer psychological mechanisms underlying brand 
equity’s differential effect on their responses would help practitioners to identify the most 
vulnerable post-crisis consumers and better design effective response strategies to retain their 
most loyal and profitable customers. Our findings suggest that when consumers attempt to 
generate counterarguments against negative information, the counterarguments become a source 
of brand equity’s buffering effect, which will help to constrain the negative side of brand equity 
by deactivating the disconfirmation of expectation mechanism. Therefore, practitioners should 
try to design their marketing strategies and post-crisis response strategies in a way to extract 
more counterarguments from consumers. For example, in a post-crisis response, marketers can 
include some reasonable excuses to hint consumers with more readily accessible 
counterarguments. Also, because biased processing is highly cognitive resource consuming, firm 
responses should be conveyed in a way with minimal background distractions to ensure 
consumers can exert enough cognitive ability to maximize the number of counterarguments 
(Ahluwalia 2000).  
The dark side of brand equity in this thesis also indicates that a brand harm crisis can be a 
great opportunity for competitor companies to plunder market share from the industry leader. In 
a routine business situation, a strong brand benefits from numerous ways such as customer 
loyalty and more effective marketing initiatives. The accumulated brand equity becomes a 
barrier protecting a strong brand from the attacks from its competitors. Thus, small companies 
often find it extremely difficult to sway the status of an industry leader. However, a brand harm 
crisis provides a chance for small companies because consumers may perceive a similar 
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wrongdoing from a good brand as intolerable and defect to competitors, especially when a brand 
crisis is severe or related to ethical conducts. In addition, marketing effectiveness may severely 
suffer in a brand harm crisis, rendering the barrier from brand equity less effective (Van Heerde 
et al. 2007). Moreover, consumer scapegoating may occur in a systemic brand harm crisis where 
the most conspicuous crisis-associated company (i.e., a well-known brand) takes 
disproportionate blame and becomes a scapegoat for an industry wide crisis (Gao et al. 2012). 
However, managers should still be cautious and restrain their optimism when a brand crisis 
happened to the industry leader because the negative effects from a brand crisis may impact the 
whole industry and spillover to themselves even they are not involved in the crisis (Roehm and 
Tybout 2006; Lei et al. 2008) 
 Finally, our research takes a consumer-based perspective, and managers should keep this 
in mind. A brand crisis has been documented to impact a variety of stakeholders such as 
consumers, shareholders, and policy makers (Chen et al. 2009). Thus, managers should first 
decide which stakeholders are the most important to them, and then they can possibly design an 
effective response strategy. For example, from a consumer perspective, Dutta and Pullig (2011) 
proved that proactive response strategies were more effective than passive strategies in 
recovering consumer attitude because people will perceive firms react proactively as more 
responsible and truly caring about consumers.  However, from a stock market perspective, Chen 
et al. (2009) found that passive strategies are superior to proactive response strategies in 
attenuating stock market price plummeting after a brand crisis. This is because stock market will 
make such an inference that only when a crisis is considered severe enough to seriously damage 
a brand will a company employ a responsive strategy because they are forced to do so. Thus, if 
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practitioners try to understand and evaluate brand equity’s effect on other stakeholders’ 
responses, they should be extremely cautious in interpreting the results from this thesis. 
9.3.Limitations and Future Research 
  
 Like all the academic research, our study also suffers a few limitations and raises some 
opportunities for future research. First, our research only examined two contingency variables, 
crisis severity and crisis type. Though these two variables fit our theoretical framework well and 
have enhanced our understanding on the role of brand equity in a brand crisis context, this is by 
no means a comprehensive framework. For example, our focus group discussion implies that 
crisis relevance may serve as another important contingency variable. Crisis relevance has also 
been documented in previous literature to moderate the effect of consumer-brand connection and 
brand familiarity in a brand crisis context (Trump 2014; Dawar and Lei 2009). Thus, future 
research could delve deeper to explore other overlooked key contingency variables and include 
more boundary conditions in the theoretical model to provide a more comprehensive 
understanding on this phenomenon. 
 Second, our research was limited by some methodological constraints. Student sample 
was used for our focus group study and two main studies. Although the usage of student sample 
is justified by stating that students are familiar with the target product category (i.e., television), 
the generalizability of our findings is nevertheless threatened due to the homogeneity of a student 
sample (Dawar and Pillutla 2000). Future research should test our findings using a more 
representative population to increase the external validity of the results. Also, we only used one 
product category and one crisis manipulation in the main studies. Thus, our findings may be 
subjective to our specific research design and cannot be confidently generalized to other crisis 
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situations. To improve generalizability, future research can test brand equity’s effect in different 
product categories using different crisis scenarios. It is plausible that product category may 
impact brand equity’s effect in a crisis context. For example, it has been identified that 
consumers tend to be less forgiving and are more likely to attribute the blame to the associated 
brand when a brand crisis is related to a product category in which products are used on a daily 
basis and are closer to the body (Haas-Kotzegger and Schlegelmilch 2013). Moreover, our 
research used real television brands in our experiment as target brands. Though a pretest 
validated this operationalization on brand equity and potential confounding variables such as 
commitment and familiarity were controlled in the study, it is still possible that some overlooked 
confounding effects may emerge, jeopardizing the internal validity of our research design. Thus, 
future research should be more rigorously controlling  for any other potential confounding 
effects such as endowment of product ownership (Tom et al., 2007) or  consumer prior 
experience with the brand stimuli. Also, we used laboratory experiments in this research and 
therefore external validity is sacrificed for internal validity. One reason for using experiments is 
that brand crisis is a non-routine situation and does not happen on a daily basis. Therefore, it is 
relatively difficult to have access to real-life data regarding brand crisis. Though case studies 
have been used in the past, causal relationships cannot be confidently verified without a 
controlled environment (Cleeren et al. 2008). Even so, it would be desirable that future research 
can use field studies or critical incident method to improve the external validity of our findings 
(Bitner et al. 1990). 
 Furthermore, in our study, we collected consumer baseline brand evaluations and post-
crisis brand evaluations across a relatively short time span. This may raise some issues for the 
reliability of our attitude change measurement. Although we included filler brands and a filler 
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task in the study to refresh consumer working memory and the results indicate that our brand 
evaluation change measures are reliable, it is desirable that future research can adopt a 
longitudinal study across a longer time span to increase the reliability of the measures (Collins 
1996). In addition, the crisis severity manipulation in our study, though valid and significant, did 
not generate a very large severity difference. Especially in study 2, even the low severity crisis 
was perceived as significantly higher than the theoretical midpoint 4. Therefore, future research 
can use different manipulation materials to enlarge the crisis severity difference and test whether 
our findings still hold.  
 In this study, we hypothesized that brand equity’s effect on consumer negative responses 
was linear, and so was the moderating role of crisis severity. However, it is possible that a 
nonlinear relationship such as a U shaped relationship exists in this context. To test potential 
nonlinear relationship, at least three data points are needed (Meyers et al. 2006). Thus, our 2 × 2 
design cannot be used to test nonlinear relationships. Future research can manipulate brand 
equity and crisis severity with three or more levels, or use measured variables to test any 
potential nonlinear relationships. 
 Alternative explanations may also exist for the consumer psychological mechanisms. For 
example, emotional and affective processes are gaining recognition in ethical decision making 
literature, implying that consumer emotions may provide another fruitful explanation (Vélez-
Garcia and Ostrosky-Solís 2006). Since our research mainly used a cognitive-based perspective 
to explain the observed effects, future research or additional robustness checks should investigate 
whether this affective-based explanations can better address the phenomenon. 
 Finally, our findings that counterarguments worked as a competitive mediator in a low 
severity performance-related crisis provide a promising avenue for future research. That is, it 
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might be worthwhile to reexamine some of the no-effect situations in previous literature for 
coexistence of competing mechanisms. As such, future research could perform additional 
mediation analyses regardless of the existence of a zero-order effect. Agreeing with Zhao et al. 
(2010), we contend that mediation effect should be more of theory-driven than data-driven. 
10. CONCLUSION 
 
Altogether, our research enriches the understanding of brand crisis literature by 
developing a theoretical framework with respect to the role of brand equity in influencing 
consumer responses. Through a focus group study and two laboratory experiments, both the 
buffering and amplifying roles of brand equity are observed in a brand crisis context and the 
effect is shown to be contingent on crisis severity and crisis type. Consumers’ psychological 
mechanisms were also delineated. The finding, along with our theoretical framework, advances 
the brand crisis literature and directs promising avenues for future researchers. Our findings also 
provide practical guidance for practitioners in evaluating and managing the potential negative 
consequences from the prevalent brand crises. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Moderator’s Question Guide 
1. Introduction (10 min) 
1.1. Welcome message 
1.2. Ground rules on focus group 
1.3. Consent forms collection 
2. Warm up questions (10 min) 
2.1. Self-introduction 
a. To begin with, could you briefly introduce yourself: what’s your name, where 
are you from, which program you are in? 
2.2. Interest on the topic 
a. What comes to your mind when you think about brand crisis? 
b. Describe the phenomenon of a brand crisis 
3. Probing questions (15 min) 
3.1. Can anyone recall one such brand crisis incident and share what you know about it 
with us? 
3.2. What do you think about this crisis? Is it severe? Does it bother you? 
3.3. Do you guys think such incidents happen a lot? 
3.4. What do you think are the major causes for such increasingly frequent crises?  
3.5. After hearing about the news, does it negatively impact your attitude and behavior? 
4. Main discussion questions (60 min) 
Participants will be shown various crisis scenarios (see Appendix 3 for the summary table) and 
be asked to discuss on each scenario based on the following probing questions. 
4.1. What do you guys think of the problem on (target brand name)? 
4.2. Do you think it is a severe problem? 
4.3. Does it surprise you when such a problem happened to (target brand name)? Is it 
within your expectation? 
4.4. What do you think are the major causes for the incident? Could you please explain a 
little bit more about what makes you think in this way? 
4.5. Who do you think should be responsible for the crisis? Why? 
4.6. Do you think this is a common practice in the industry?  
If so, do you think the crisis is justified? Does it mean the firm should not be the one to 
blame? 
4.7. How likely do you think (target brand name) will make similar mistakes in the future? 
96 
 
Do you guys think this is just an accident for (target brand name) or do you think it is 
very common for (target brand name)? 
4.8. Does this incident affect the image of or your attitude towards (target brand name) in 
your mind? 
If you had the chance to seriously consider purchasing a product from (target brand 
name), do you think this incident will actually influence your purchase decisions? 
4.9. What do you think would be an acceptable response from (target brand name)? 
4.10. What kind of responses do you think can eliminate the impact on your attitude and 
purchase decisions you indicated before? 
4.11. How likely do you think (target brand name) will actually implement the response 
you suggested? 
5. Closing (5 min) 
 5.1. Thank participants 
 5.2. Debrief participants 
 5.3. Distribute incentives 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Scenario 1.3 
 
 
Scenario 2.3 
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Scenario 1.4 
 
Scenario 2.4 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
Brand Equity Measure 
Five seven-point semantic differential scale (Yoo and Donthu 2001; Brady et al. 2008) 
Pretest 1: α = .92;  
Experiment 1: α = .94;  
Experiment 2: α = .92;  
 
 How loyal are you to (target brand name)?  
“1 = not at all, 7 = very loyal” 
 What kind of attitude do you have about (target brand name)? 
“1 = negative, 7 = positive” 
 What kind of image do you have about (target brand name)? 
“1 = negative, 7 = positive” 
 How would you rate the product quality delivered by (target brand name)? 
“1 = low quality, 7 = high quality” 
 Would you be willing to pay more for (target brand name)? 
“1 = definitely not, 7 = definitely” 
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APPENDIX 4 
 
 
Brand Attitude Measure 
Five seven-point semantic differential scale (Ahluwalia et al. 2000; Puzakpva et al. 2013) 
Experiment 1 Pre: α = .97; 
Experiment 1 Post: α = .97;  
Experiment 2 Pre: α = .96;  
Experiment 2 Post: α = .95; 
 
 To what extent do you think (target brand name) is good?  
“1 = bad, 7 = good” 
 To what extent do you think (target brand name) is favorable? 
“1 = unfavorable, 7 = favorable” 
 To what extent do you think (target brand name) is desirable? 
“1 = undesirable, 7 = desirable” 
 To what extent do you like (target brand name)? 
“1 = dislike, 7 = like” 
 To what extent do you think (target brand name) is pleasant? 
“1 = unpleasant, 7 = pleasant” 
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APPENDIX 5 
 
 
Brand Trust Measure 
Three seven-point semantic differential scale (Dawar and Pillutla 2000; Puzakpva et al. 2013) 
Experiment 1 Pre: α = .95;  
Experiment 1 Post: α = .97;  
Experiment 2 Pre: α = .96;  
Experiment 2 Post: α = .94; 
 
 To what extent do you think (target brand name) is reliable?  
“1 = unreliable, 7 = reliable” 
 To what extent do you think (target brand name) is dependable? 
“1 = not at all dependable, 7 = dependable” 
 To what extent do you think (target brand name) is trustworthy? 
“1 = not at all trustworthy, 7 = trustworthy” 
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APPENDIX 6 
 
 
Purchase Intention Measure 
Two seven-point Likert scale (Puzakpva et al. 2013) 
Experiment 1 Pre: α = .95;  
Experiment 1 Post: α = .98;  
Experiment 2 Pre: α = .95;  
Experiment 2 Post: α = .97; 
 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
“1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree” 
 The next time I buy a TV, I will take (target brand name) into consideration 
 I can imagine myself buying a (target brand name) TV 
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APPENDIX 7 
 
 
Filler Task 
 
Please complete the following mathematic questions! 
 
100 /25 = __    
15 + __ = 3        
69 + 19 = __    
40 × 5 = __ 
100 / 4 = __ 
102 / 2 = __ 
12 + 13 + 1 = __ 
456 + 19 = __ 
200 × ½  = __ 
 
 
100 / __ = 4 
__ + 35 = 234 
11 – 7 – 2 = __ 
80 × 5 = __ 
88 / 2 = __ 
60 / 5 = __ 
600 – 555 = __ 
126 – 7 = __ 
80 × ½  = __
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APPENDIX 8 
 
 
Thought Listing Task (Ahluwalia et al. 2000) 
 
Please take 5 minutes to list all the thoughts you had while you were reading the newspaper 
article about (target brand name). If possible, please try to write out as many thoughts as possible. 
(There is no need to summarize the news article, please try to give your opinions on (target 
brand name) and the problem reported in the article) 
 
Please start a new line for each thought! 
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APPENDIX 9 
 
 
Crisis Severity Measure 
Three seven-point semantic differential scale (Roehm and Brady 2007) 
Experiment 1: α = .93;  
Experiment 2: α = .92;  
 
I think the problem described in the newspaper article about (target brand name) is: 
 “1 = not at all severe, 7 = very severe” 
 “1 = a minor problem, 7 = a major problem” 
 “1 = not at all significant, 7 = very significant” 
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APPENDIX 10 
 
 
Disconfirmation of Expectation Measure 
Three seven-point semantic differential scale (Ahluwalia et al. 2002) 
Experiment 1: α = .86;  
Experiment 2: α = .90;  
 
I think the problem described in the newspaper article about (target brand name) is: 
 “1 = consistent with my expectation, 7 = inconsistent with my expectation” 
 “1 = not at all worse than I anticipated, 7 = worse than I anticipated” 
 “1 = not at all worse than I expected, 7 = worse than I expected” 
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APPENDIX 11 
 
 
Negativity Manipulation Check Measure 
Two seven-point Likert scale (Pullig et al. 2006; Dutta and Pullig 2011) 
Pretest 2: α = .83;  
Pretest 3: α = .81;  
Experiment 1: α = .77;  
Experiment 2: α = .86;  
 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
“1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree” 
 
 The newspaper article provided negative information about (target brand name) 
 The newspaper article provided unfavorable information about (target brand name) 
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APPENDIX 12 
 
 
Crisis Type Manipulation Check Measure 
1. Two seven-point Likert scale (Pullig et al. 2006; Dutta and Pullig 2011) 
 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
“1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree” 
 
 The news report referred to a specific defect about (target brand name) products 
 The news report referred to firm conduct instead of product performance about (target 
brand name)  
 
2. One classification question about crisis type. 
 
 Which aspect do you think the news article referred to? 
 
☐   Product defect  OR  ☐   Conduct of the company 
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APPENDIX 13 
 
 
Familiarity, Involvement, and Believability Check Measure 
Seven-point Likert scale (Pullig et al. 2006) 
Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
 I am familiar with the newspaper article before the study. 
 I was very involved while reading the newspaper article. 
 I paid a lot of attention while reading the newspaper article. 
 I find the newspaper article about (target brand name) very believable. 
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APPENDIX 14 
 
High Severity Performance-related Crisis Scenarios 
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APPENDIX 15 
 
Low Severity Performance-related Crisis Scenarios 
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APPENDIX 16 
 
High Severity Value-related Crisis Scenarios 
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APPENDIX 17 
 
Low Severity Value-related Crisis Scenarios 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1a: Group 1 Descriptive Statistics 
No Age Gender Nationality 
1 51 female Canadian 
2 23 female Canadian 
3 24 male Indian 
4 27 male Brazalian 
5 22 female Canadian 
6 22 female Brazalian 
7 22 female Chinese 
8 24 male Indian 
9 21 male Canadian 
10 22 female Brazalian 
 
Table 1b: Group 2 Descriptive Statistics 
No Age Gender Nationality 
1 26 female Saudi Arabian 
2 30 male Pakistani 
3 19 male Canadian 
4 24 female Chinese 
5 28 male Bangladeshi 
6 28 female Bangladeshi 
7 30 male Chinese 
8 20 female South Asian 
9 23 male Canadian 
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Table 2: Scenarios Summary in Focus Groups 
 
Group 1 
Scenario 1.1 
A real news video about GM’s recall due to switch 
ignition problem. 
Video is accessible online: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UNpcpLTMZ2s 
Scenario 1.2 
A real news video about Apple’s price fixing scandal. 
Video is accessible online: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ckv5nBGuJs8 
Scenario 1.3 
A fictitious newspaper article we made up regarding 
Sony’s TV catching fire and get recalled 
(see Appendix 4) 
Scenario 1.4 
A fictitious newspaper article we made up regarding 
Insignia’s poor labor practice in developing countries 
(see Appendix 4) 
Group 2 
Scenario 2.1 
A real news video about BMW’s recall due to 
mechanical failure and faulty fuel pumps. 
Video is accessible online: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jJ0PRFHEhwo 
Scenario 2.2 
A real news video about Apple’s price fixing scandal. 
Video is accessible online: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ckv5nBGuJs8 
Scenario 2.3 
A fictitious newspaper article we made up regarding 
Insignia’s TV catching fire and get recalled 
(see Appendix 4) 
Scenario 2.4 
A fictitious newspaper article we made up regarding 
Sony’s poor labor practice in developing countries (see 
Appendix 4) 
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Table 3: Means (Standard Deviation) of Dependent Variables in Experiment 1 
 
    Pre-crisis   Post-crisis 
  
Low Severity   High Severity 
 
Low Severity   High Severity 
    
High 
BE 
Low 
BE 
  
High 
BE 
Low 
BE 
  
High 
BE 
Low 
BE 
  
High 
BE 
Low 
BE 
Brand 
Attitude 
5.57 
(1.17) 
3.26 
(1.20) 
6.41 
(.65) 
2.82 
(.96) 
  
4.83 
(1.26) 
2.34 
(1.10) 
4.29 
(1.17) 
1.63 
(.75) 
Brand Trust 
5.72 
(1.05) 
3.46 
(1.19) 
6.36 
(.71) 
3.05 
(1.15) 
4.43 
(1.33) 
2.15 
(.98) 
  
3.95 
(1.32) 
1.61 
(.74) 
Purchase 
Intention 
5.49 
(1.37) 
3.00 
(1.91) 
6.25 
(.96) 
2.43 
(1.43) 
5.18 
(1.45) 
2.17 
(1.70) 
4.33 
(1.77) 
1.56 
(1.11) 
N 34 29   36 34   34 29   36 34 
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Table 4: Difference Scores (Standard Deviation) of Dependent Variables in Experiment 1 
 
    Low Severity   High Severity 
    High BE Low BE   High BE Low BE 
Brand Attitude Change .74 (.83) .92 (.88)   2.12 (1.11) 1.19 (.77) 
Brand Trust Change 1.28 (1.10) 1.31 (.91)   2.41 (1.25) 1.44 (.96) 
Purchase Intention Change .32 (1.08) .83 (1.28)   1.92 (1.42) .87 (.97) 
N 34 29   36 34 
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Table 5: Means (Standard Deviation) of Dependent Variables in Experiment 2 
 
    Pre-crisis   Post-crisis 
  
Low Severity   High Severity 
 
Low Severity   High Severity 
    
High 
BE 
Low 
BE 
  
High 
BE 
Low 
BE 
  
High 
BE 
Low 
BE 
  
High 
BE 
Low 
BE 
Brand 
Attitude 
6.26 
(.66) 
3.28 
(1.44) 
5.95 
(.75) 
3.18 
(1.16) 
  
4.30 
(.89) 
2.51 
(1.14) 
3.57 
(1.26) 
2.12 
(.86) 
Brand Trust 
6.37 
(.64) 
3.60 
(1.54) 
5.97 
(.90) 
3.63 
(1.37) 
4.88 
(1.33) 
2.79 
(1.43) 
  
4.04 
(1.42) 
2.45 
(1.16) 
Purchase 
Intention 
6.17 
(1.08) 
3.33 
(1.91) 
6.07 
(1.04) 
2.71 
(1.64) 
5.00 
(1.33) 
2.59 
(1.70) 
4.47 
(1.70) 
1.75 
(.99) 
N 30 33   31 33   30 33   31 33 
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Table 6: Difference Scores (Standard Deviation) of Dependent Variables in Experiment 2 
 
    Low Severity   High Severity 
    High BE Low BE   High BE Low BE 
Brand Attitude Change 1.96 (1.10) .77 (.99)   2.37 (1.29) 1.05 (1.08) 
Brand Trust Change 1.50 (1.26) .80 (.97)   1.92 (1.53) 1.18 (1.28) 
Purchase Intention Change 1.17 (1.23) .74 (1.40)   1.60 (1.76) .95 (1.41) 
N 30 33   31 33 
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Figure 1: Interaction Effect between BE and Crisis Severity on Attitude Change      
(Performance-related Crisis) 
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Figure 2: Interaction Effect between BE and Crisis Severity on Trust Change          
(Performance-related Crisis) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
122 
 
Figure 3: Interaction Effect between BE and Crisis Severity on Purchase Intention Change 
(Performance-related Crisis) 
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Figure 4: Interaction Effect between BE and Crisis Severity on Attitude Change                
(Value-related Crisis) 
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Figure 5: Interaction Effect between BE and Crisis Severity on Trust Change                     
(Value-related Crisis) 
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Figure 6: Interaction Effect between BE and Crisis Severity on Purchase Intention Change  
(Value-related Crisis) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
